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ABSTRACT 
 
Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the degree Magister Legume, University of the 
Western Cape. 
 
In this research, I sought to investigate the extent to which South Africa recognises 
international surrogacy agreements. I examined Chapter 19 of the Children’s Act as the 
first legislation to afford surrogate motherhood agreements legal recognition in South 
Africa. Section 292(1)(b)-(e) of the Children’s Act sets out the requirements for the 
validity of a surrogate agreement. The validity of the agreement is governed by South 
African law if it was concluded in South Africa, and at least one of the commissioning 
parents and the surrogate mother and her husband or partner must be domiciled in 
South Africa at the time of entering into the agreement.  
 
I explored South African legislation that may be applicable to the children born of 
commissioning parents (whether the commissioning parents are South Africans or 
foreign nationals) who entered into international surrogacy agreements. I concluded that 
the main issue that relates to international surrogacy are the implications that rise from 
registering a surrogate born child’s birth in South Africa and in other countries. I further 
concluded that the current position of South African law will result in a surrogate born 
child being left stateless and parentless. 
 
I considered the criminal aspect of international surrogacy agreements as a 
consequence of a null and void international surrogacy agreement. Furthermore, I 
referred to the legal difficulties of international surrogacy and potential rights infringed on 
or denied to the child born of an international surrogacy by examining international case 
law. I concluded that South African courts do not have precedents, guidelines or 
legislation governing international surrogacy agreements and thus it is important to 
examine international case law. I further concluded that, it is important for South African 
authorities and courts to consider the possibility of international surrogacy occurring in 
South Africa. I hope that the South African courts take a child-centered approach, 
building on the views established in the international case law, and that courts do not 
adopt a strict interpretation of our current laws. 
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Lastly, I suggested recommendations for the appropriate manner in which to legislate 
international surrogacy agreements in South Africa. I submitted that judicial and 
administrative authorities could inspect the international surrogacy agreement and 
ensure that the terms do not harm the child and that the child is recognised as the legal 
child of the commissioning parents. The courts should first look at the suitability of the 
commissioning parents and finally consider the best interest of the child as being of 
paramount importance, before ordering the international surrogacy agreement null and 
void. 
 
I further suggested that a statutory regulation that contemplates international surrogacy 
should be formulated, as a source of reference, which will assist a court when faced with 
determining the issue of the parentage of a surrogate born child, and consequently, his 
or her nationality. I concluded that the South African Parliament should either re-draft or 
provide clearer guidelines regarding surrogacy and the possibility of international 
surrogacy agreements. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction: Background to this study 
Surrogacy is one of the methods of assisted reproduction. A surrogate motherhood 
agreement is defined as “an agreement between a surrogate mother and a 
commissioning parent whereby it is agreed that the surrogate mother will be artificially 
fertilised for the purpose of bearing a child for the commissioning parent.”1 The 
agreement is concluded before the surrogate mother2 is fertilised and it is made with the 
sole intention of the resulting child being handed over to the commissioning parent(s).3 
The surrogate mother thus relinquishes all responsibilities and rights regarding that 
child. There are two types of surrogate motherhood agreements: partial and full 
surrogacy.4 In partial surrogacy, the surrogate mother becomes pregnant with the sperm 
of the intended father5 or she is inseminated with donor sperm. The surrogate mother is 
genetically linked to the child. In full surrogacy, an embryo is created by in vitro 
fertilisation, using the egg of the commissioning mother (or a donor egg) and the sperm 
of the commissioning father (or a donor sperm). As a result, the surrogate mother has 
no genetic relationship with the child.6 
The increased interest in surrogacy as an alternative means of reproduction could be 
attributed to a wide range of reasons. These reasons include improved medical 
technology, a wider public acceptance of surrogacy, a decrease in new born babies 
becoming available for adoption, increased access to information, increased access to 
global travel and financially motivated reasons.7 Furthermore, entering into a surrogacy 
motherhood agreement is either prohibited, strictly regulated or financially inaccessible 
                                                          
1
 “and in which the surrogate mother undertakes to hand over such child to the commissioning parent 
upon its birth, or within a reasonable time thereafter, with the intention that the child concerned becomes 
the legitimate child of the commissioning parent.” This definition is provided for in section 1(1) of the 
Children’s Act 38 of 2005. 
2
 A surrogate mother may be defined as a woman who carries a child pursuant to an agreement made 
between herself and the commissioning parent(s). 
3
 Trimmings K and Beaumont P (2013) ‘General Report on Surrogacy’ in Trimmings K and Beaumont P 
(ed) International Surrogacy Arrangements: Legal Regulation at the International Level 440. 
4
 Also known as traditional (partial) and gestational (full) surrogacy. 
5
 Usually by insemination. 
6
 Trimmings and Beaumont (2013: 440). 
7
 Talip T (2013) ‘Lost in Transit: Cross border surrogacy arrangements and the right of children not to be 
discriminated against on the basis of their birth or status’ (LLM dissertation University of the Western 
Cape) 7; Mohapatra S (2012) ‘Stateless babies and adoption scams: A bioethical analysis of international 
commercial surrogacy’Berkeley Journal of International Law Vol 30 2 413. 
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in certain States. Thus, commissioning parents residing in these States go abroad to 
countries where surrogacy is legal or the law is more flexible.8 This is referred to as 
international surrogacy. International surrogacy occurs when commissioning parent(s) 
resident in one country enters into an agreement with a surrogate resident in a 
different country.
9
 The agreement is referred to as an international surrogacy 
agreement. Such an agreement may well involve gamete donor(s) in the country 
where the surrogate resides, or even in a third country.
10
 
Problems often arise when the commissioning parent(s) attempt to return to their home 
country with the child.11 Problems arise when the legal relationship between the 
commissioning parents and the child exists under one law, but is not recognised by 
another legal system. Thus, the legal rights and obligations of commissioning parents 
regarding the child may be recognised in one State but not recognised in another and 
are therefore not enforceable. This is referred to as a limping legal relationship. 
Problems may also arise when the commissioning parent(s) wish to register the child’s 
foreign birth certificate in their home country or when they attempt to register a judicial or 
administrative order relating to the child’s parentage in their home country.12 
Additionally, difficulties could arise later when the child’s parentage is brought into 
question in matters relating to parental rights and responsibilities such as care and 
maintenance.13 The most common problems which have been identified are the risk of 
the surrogate born child being left stateless and with uncertain parentage.14 
                                                          
8
 Lin T (2013) ‘Born Lost: Stateless children in international surrogacy arrangements’ Cardozo Journal of 
International & Comparative Law Vol. 21 Issue 2 553. 
9
 The Hague Conference on Private International Law Permanent Bureau A Preliminary Report on the 
Issues Arising from International Surrogacy Arrangements Preliminary Document No 10 of March 2012 i 
10
 The Hague Conference on Private International Law Permanent Bureau A Preliminary Report on the 
Issues Arising from International Surrogacy Arrangements Preliminary Document No 10 of March 2012 i 
11
 Baby Manji Yamada v Union of India and Anr; G (Surrogacy: Foreign Domicile) (2008) 1 FLR 1047. 
12
 The Hague Conference on Private International Permanent Bureau “A Preliminary Report on Private 
International Law Issues Surrounding the Status of Children, including issues arising from International 
Surrogacy Arrangements” Preliminary Document No 11 of March 2011 available at 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/genaff2011pd11e.pdf (Accessed on 23 February 2015) para 13; Baby 
Manji Yamada v Union of India and Anr; G (Surrogacy: Foreign Domicile) (2008) 1 FLR 1047. 
13
 HCCH Preliminary Document 11 (March 2011) para 14. 
14
 Heaton J “The Pitfalls of International Surrogacy: A South African Family Law Perspective” 2015 (78) 
Journal of Contemporary Roman-Dutch Law, 26-27European Parliament: Directorate General for Internal 
Policies (Policy Department C: Citizen’s rights and constitutional affairs) ‘A comparative study on the 
regime of surrogacy in EU member 
states’ (May 2013); HCCH Preliminary Document 11 (March 2011) para 13; Baby Manji Yamada v Union 
of India and Anr (Japan/India).; G (Surrogacy: Foreign Domicile). 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Section 292 (1) (a) -(e) of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 (“Children’s Act”) regulates 
surrogacy in South Africa. It is important to note the requirements of section 292(1) (b), 
(c) and (d) of the Children’s Act, namely that, the surrogate motherhood agreement must 
be concluded in South Africa; at least one of the commissioning parents must be 
domiciled in South Africa when the agreement was entered into and the surrogate 
mother and her husband or partner must be domiciled in South Africa at the time of the 
conclusion of the agreement.15 Thus, should the requirements not be fulfilled, the High 
Court will refuse to confirm the agreement and the agreement would be invalid and 
unenforceable.16  
The objective of this dissertation is to explore how a South African court might approach 
an international surrogacy agreement concluded by a South African with a foreign 
surrogate mother or an agreement between a South African surrogate mother and 
foreign commissioning parent(s) which has not been confirmed by the High Court of 
South Africa. The importance of exploring this topic is shown through the problems 
arising from international surrogacy mentioned above. It has already been submitted, 
that because of the increase of surrogacy and rigid domestic laws of a country, couples 
seek surrogates elsewhere. Thus, it may be submitted that it is possible that South 
Africans might do the same. Therefore, the author finds it necessary to explore the 
possibility of international surrogacy occurring in South Africa or affecting South African 
nationals who seek surrogacy services abroad. Additionally, what approach the South 
African court might take is to be discussed. Furthermore, the author will explore the 
possibility of evasion of the domicile requirement by foreigners.  
1.2 The Status and Rights of the Surrogate born Child 
 
In the past, references to the status of a child in many legal systems had been 
references to a child’s status as a child born out of wedlock or born within a marriage.17 
However, in recent decades, in many legal systems, the distinction between legitimate 
and illegitimate children has been abolished.18 The United Nation Convention on the 
                                                          
15
 Section 292(1)(b),(c) and (d) of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005; Louw A Acquisition of Parental 
Responsibilities and Rights (2009) 336 - 337; Louw A ‘Surrogate Motherhood’ in Davel CJ and Skelton A 
Commentary on the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 (2007) 19-8. 
16
 Louw (2007:19-8). 
17
 Hcch (2011:4). 
18
 Ibid. 
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Rights of the Child19 and the European Convention on Human Rights20 confirm a child’s 
right to parentage, a right to know their parentage and a right to non-discrimination 
through their status acquired at birth by virtue of their parentage.21 The determination of 
who has legal parentage for a child has far reaching consequences, which will affect the 
child not only in childhood but also into adulthood. Parentage determines nationality, 
rights of citizenship, rights of abode, who is responsible for a child’s care and who is 
responsible to provide for a child.22 
 
In South Africa, a child has a right ‘to a name and a nationality from birth’.23 
Furthermore, a child’s best interests are of paramount importance in every matter 
concerning the child.24 With this in mind, the author will explore how the consequences 
of an invalid international surrogacy agreement could affect the surrogate born child.   
  
1.3 Increase of International Surrogacy Agreements 
 
Despite its expanding occurrence, the global surrogacy market remains completely 
unregulated. This leaves parties to international surrogacy agreements at a serious risk 
of exploitation and results in complex legal problems in individual cases of international 
surrogacy agreements.25  
Countries have taken different legislative approaches to surrogacy agreements. 
Combined with a lack of international regulation, this divergence creates a number of 
legal problems and conflict of law issues. Several countries, including France, Italy, 
Germany, China and Japan26 ban surrogacy arrangements altogether, even if no 
commercial element is present in the agreement. Others such as South Africa, the 
                                                          
19
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1990) available at 
http://www.unicef.org.uk/Documents/Publicationpdfs/UNCRC_PRESS200910web.pdf (Accessed on 23 
February 2015). 
20
 The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (1950) available at 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf> (Accessed on 23 February 2015). 
21
 Hutchinson AM (2012) ‘The Hague Convention on surrogacy: Should we agree to disagree’ American 
Bar Association Section of Family Law 2012 Fall CLE Conference (unpublished) 5. 
22
Hutchinson (2012:5). 
23
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, s 28(1)(a). 
24
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, s 20(2). 
25
 Trimmings and Beaumont (2013:442). 
26
 As well as Germany, Mexico, Sweden and Switzerland. The Hague Conference on Private International 
Law Permanent Bureau A Preliminary Report on the Issues Arising from International Surrogacy 
Arrangements Preliminary Document No 10 of March 2012 para 10. 
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United Kingdom, New Zealand, Israel, and Holland allow altruistic surrogacy only.27 In 
only a few countries is commercial surrogacy allowed and are such surrogacy 
agreements legally enforceable. These countries, including India, Israel, Ukraine, Russia 
and some American states (California and Florida), have consequently become 
destinations for couples seeking a child via surrogacy.28 
The author will provide a few examples of the dangers of unregulated international 
surrogacy agreements: 
1. A couple (who intend to be commissioning parents) contacts a surrogacy agency 
on the internet; they enter into an agreement with the agency and the surrogate 
mother. The couple will provide their own gametes, thus it will be a gestational 
surrogacy agreement. The agreement is also a commercial agreement.29 After 
the child is born, the laws of the country in which the child was born may view the 
commissioning parents’ as having full parental responsibility and rights regarding 
the child and the surrogate mother as having no responsibilities and rights 
regarding the child. The commissioning parents would possibly take the child 
home to their state of origin, where the law might not recognise commercial 
surrogacy. This means that the child will not be recognised as their child, thus the 
child is stateless and parentless.  
2. The laws of the State in which the commissioning parents were born might not 
recognise the birth certificate granted in the State in which the surrogate born 
child was born.  
3. There is a possibility that the commissioning parents would be unable to obtain a 
passport or travel document for the child. 
4. The child born from a surrogate agreement may not only be stateless and 
parentless but his or her fundamental rights and will be affected, including the 
right not to suffer adverse discrimination on the basis of birth or parental status, 
the right of the child to have his or her best interests regarded as a primary 
consideration in all actions concerning him or her, as well as the child’s rights to 
acquire a nationality and to preserve his or her identity.30 
                                                          
27
 Trimmings and Beaumont (2013:454). 
28
 Trimmings and Beaumont (2013: 443). 
29
 The surrogate mother will be compensated beyond her reasonable expenses. 
30
 The United Nationals Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, Arts 2, 3, 7, 8 and 9. 
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There are currently no international laws regulating international surrogacy agreements. 
Additionally, there are no provisions applicable for rights of parentage either from 
perspective of the commissioning parent(s), surrogate mothers or most importantly the 
child. Furthermore there are no means by which internationally mobile parents can 
ensure that parental responsibilities and rights acquired in one state can be recognised 
in their new state of habitual residence (if they decided to relocate). The lack of 
international standards or regulations also raises serious child protection concerns.31 
1.4 Hague Conference on Private International Law and International 
Surrogacy 
In April 2010, the Council on General Affairs, “invited the Permanent Bureau to provide a 
brief preliminary note to the Council of 2011 on the private international law issues 
surrounding the status of children (excluding adoption) and, in particular, on the issue of 
recognition of parent-child relationships”.32 The growing issues of international surrogacy 
agreements were also discussed in the Council’s conclusions, which “acknowledged the 
complex issues of private international law and child protection arising from the growth 
in cross-border surrogacy arrangements”.33 The Council, in April 2011, requested that 
the Permanent Bureau intensify the investigation, with emphasis on the broad range of 
issues arising from international surrogacy agreements, and produce a Preliminary 
Report on progress in 2012.34  
In 2012 the Permanent Bureau published a Preliminary Report (“Preliminary Report”) 
that reflects issues surrounding the status of children, including issues arising from 
international surrogacy arrangements.35 The Preliminary Report identified the serious 
problems arising from international surrogacy arrangements which are often that a child 
                                                          
31
 Hutchinson AM (2012:4). 
32
 Conclusions and Recommendations of the Council on General Affairs and Policy of the Conference 
(2010), p. 3.    
33
 Conclusions and Recommendations of the Council on General Affairs and Policy of the Conference 
(2010), p 3. 
34
 Conclusions and Recommendations of the Council on General Affairs and Policy of the Conference 
(2011) para 17-20. 
35
 The Hague Conference on Private International Law Permanent Bureau Private International Law 
Issues Surrounding the Status of Children, including Issues Arising from International Surrogacy 
Arrangements Preliminary Document No 11 of March 2011 3-4. 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
ends up being stateless and parentless. The Preliminary Report provides that the 
disparities of States fall into four broad categories:36  
1. States which prohibit surrogacy arrangements 
2. States in which surrogacy is largely unregulated 
3. States which expressly permit and regulate surrogacy 
4. States with a permissive approach to surrogacy, including commercial surrogacy. 
The Preliminary Report conveys that international surrogacy arrangements implicate the 
fundamental rights and interests of children, rights and interests which have already 
been widely recognised by the international community.37 Thus the crucial need is for a 
multilateral instrument which would put in place structures and procedures to enable 
States to ensure that these obligations are being met in the context of this transnational 
occurrence.38 This would include ensuring that these children have parentage, 
nationality, ensuring their rights to know their identity is secured; and putting in place 
procedures to ensure that they are protected from harm.39Additionally, the multilateral 
instrument should also ensure that the surrogate mother, particular those mothers from 
economically disadvantages backgrounds, and the intending parents are protected from 
any harm that may arise from the international surrogacy arrangement.40  
During the April 2013 annual meeting, the Council received an oral update provided by 
the Permanent Bureau, and decided to circulate a number of questionnaires to various 
recipients – one was directed to members of the Hague conference and other interested 
states and three online questionnaires were sent to legal practitioners, health 
professionals and surrogacy agencies.41 Recently, in March 2014, the Permanent 
                                                          
36
 The Hague Conference on Private International Law Permanent Bureau A Preliminary Report on the 
Issues Arising from International Surrogacy Arrangements Preliminary Document No 10 of March 2012  9-
16. 
37
 The Hague Conference on Private International Law Permanent Bureau A Preliminary Report on the 
Issues Arising from International Surrogacy Arrangements Preliminary Document No 10 of March 2012 
26. 
38
 The Hague Conference on Private International Law Permanent Bureau a Preliminary Report on the 
Issues Arising from International Surrogacy Arrangements Preliminary Document No 10 of March 2012 
26. 
39
 The Hague Conference on Private International Law Permanent Bureau a Preliminary Report on the 
Issues Arising from International Surrogacy Arrangements Preliminary Document No 10 of March 2012 
26. 
40
 The Hague Conference on Private International Law Permanent Bureau a Preliminary Report on the 
Issues Arising from International Surrogacy Arrangements Preliminary Document No 10 of March 2012   
26-27. 
41
 All questionnaires are available at http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=text.display&tid=183. 
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Bureau published two additional studies concerning parentage and surrogacy and, more 
specifically, about the issues arising from international surrogacy arrangements.42 In 
April 2014, the Hague Conference agreed to continue to explore the feasibility of an 
international convention on surrogacy. In February 2016, the Experts’ Group on 
Parentage / Surrogacy (“the Group”) met in The Hague. The Group determined that, 
owing to the complexity of the subject and the diversity of approaches by States to these 
matters, definitive conclusions could not be reached at the meeting as to the feasibility 
of a possible work product in this area and its type or scope. The Group was of the view 
that work should continue and at this stage, the consideration of the feasibility should 
focus primarily on recognition of children’s status when they are born of surrogacy 
agreements.43 
1.5 Objective of this study 
The research aims to examine South Africa’s approach to recognising surrogacy 
agreements with an international dimension entered into South Africa and/or abroad. 
The author will examine reported South African cases in order to establish how the 
South African courts interpret and implement the Children’s Act. This research will also 
provide hypothetical scenarios that may occur in South Africa. These hypothetical 
scenarios will reflect problems that may arise from international surrogacy agreements. 
This will assist in providing reasons why South African courts should implement 
safeguards in the context of international surrogacy agreements.  
 
Thereafter, the research aims to examine South Africa’s approach to surrogacy with 
international dimensions. The author submits that South African law appears to 
recognise the possibility of international surrogacy agreements.44 Thus, the author will 
explore to what extent South African law recognises international surrogacy. The author 
submits that it may be necessary to implement safeguards to protect commissioning 
parent(s), surrogate mothers and the child should the South African court be seized with 
                                                          
42
 The Desirability and Feasibility of Further Work on the Parentage/Surrogacy Project and a Study of 
Legal Parentage and the Issues Arising From International Surrogacy Arrangements. 
43
 Report of the February 2016 Meeting of the Experts’ Group on Parentage / Surrogacy A Preliminary 
Document No 3 of February 2016 3 
44
 Section 292(2) of the Children’s Act - a court may, on good cause shown, dispense with the 
requirement that the surrogate mother and her husband/partner must be domiciled in South Africa. 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
a scenario where a foreign couple enters South Africa to find a surrogate mother or 
where South Africans go abroad to find surrogate mothers. 
 
The research also aims to examine the requirements and procedures available in South 
African law concerning the birth registration of children, surrogacy agreements and 
citizenship. The author will be examining the Birth and Deaths Registration Act 51 of 
1992, the South Africa Citizenship Act 88 of 1995, Domicile Act 3 of 1992 and the 
Children’s Act 38 of 2005.  By doing this, the author will examine how the birth 
registration of a child is conducted in South Africa with a view to examine what might 
occur in relation to the birth registration of a child born of international surrogacy. 
Additionally, the author will examine what procedures foreigners must undertake in order 
to attain citizenship in South Africa for themselves as commissioning parents and for the 
child born from a surrogacy agreement. Furthermore, the research will explore what 
might happen to a foreigners’ parental status in South Africa, if he or she decides to 
leave South Africa after receiving a child born from a surrogate mother. Furthermore, the 
research will examine what procedures are available for courts to discover whether a 
foreigner is in fact domiciled in South Africa. 
 
1.6 Research Question: 
 
The research paper will address the question to what extent the South African legal 
system prohibits international surrogacy? And if a South African Court is faced with an 
opportunity to determine a matter regarding international surrogacy, would the courts 
recognise legal parentage and enforce birth registration of children born from 
international surrogacy agreements?  
 
In addressing this question, the author will examine section 292(2) of the Children’s Act 
which provides for the domicile requirement of the surrogate mother and/or her partner 
to be dispensed with on grounds of good cause shown. The author will also consider the 
increase of international surrogacy agreements and the dangers thereof. Cases from 
South Africa as well as international cases which illustrate problems encountered will be 
used to demonstrate the legal difficulties and potential rights infringed on or denied to 
the child born of an international surrogacy agreement. The author will consider South 
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African legislation that may have an influence on the recognition of international 
surrogacy agreements. 
 
1.7 Significance of the research  
International surrogacy agreements form part of a growing medical tourism industry.45 A 
significant number of international cases have highlighted the need to address and 
regulate international surrogacy agreements. These cases have exposed the real risk of 
children born of an international surrogacy agreement being denied their basic rights. 
The rise of mobility, commercialisation of surrogacy and the decrease of fertility make it 
highly likely that international surrogacy problems might arise.  
Although some research46 has addressed the issue of international surrogacy in South 
Africa, there is general consensus that an international surrogacy agreement will be 
invalid in South Africa and thus the child will be the child of the surrogate mother. 
However, some authors have examined how the South African courts interpret the 
requirements of a valid surrogacy agreement and claim that there is a need for a change 
of laws regulating surrogacy in South Africa.47 The study will add to existing literature 
regarding the need for a change. The study will also contribute to the existing literature 
regarding the South African court’s interpretation of Chapter 19 of the Children’s Act.48 It 
will contribute to existing literature on the rights and protection of the child born from a 
surrogacy agreement. The research paper will examine and explore South African 
legislation regulating citizenship, nationality and birth registration. It will outline the 
potential risks that a surrogate born child may be exposed to. The research will address 
the need to consider the possibility of a South African court being seized with an 
international surrogacy case. Therefore, this dissertation will be the first examine to what 
extent South African law prohibits international surrogacy as well as what approach 
South African courts should take regarding international surrogacy agreements. 
                                                          
45
 Talip (2013:14). 
46
 Professor Anna Louw in (2007) ‘Surrogate Motherhood’ in Davel CJ and Skelton A Commentary on the 
Children’s Act 38 of 2005 and in 2009) Acquisition of Parental Responsibilities and Rights (LLD Thesis); 
Bonthuys E and Broeders N (2013) “Guidelines for the Approval of Surrogate Motherhood Agreements: 
Ex Parte WH (2013) 130 The South African Law Journal 493;  Slabbert M and Roodt C (2013) ‘South 
Africa’ in Trimmings K and Beaumont P (ed) International Surrogacy Arrangements: Legal Regulation at 
the International Level 325; Heaton J (2015) ‘The pitfalls of international surrogacy: A South African family 
law perspective’. 
47
 Slabbert M and Roodt C (2013) ‘South Africa’ in Trimmings K and Beaumont P (ed) International 
Surrogacy Arrangements: Legal Regulation at the International Level 325. 
48
 Children’s Act 38 of 2005. 
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1.8 Literature Review 
The following will be overviews of a few South Africa academics and their analysis of 
international surrogacy in South Africa. 
Louw49 has through her own analysis of section 292(2) argued that the underlying aim of 
the provisions included in the Children’s Act50 was to prevent couples from concluding 
surrogacy agreements in other jurisdictions where the procedures are less cumbersome, 
while at the same time excluding the possibility of foreigners abusing legalised surrogate 
motherhood in South Africa.51 Louw argues that with regards to section 292(2) of the 
Children’s Act52, commissioning parent(s) may use a relative (who is a non-South 
African) as a surrogate mother. Thus, a pre-authorisation of an international surrogate 
agreement by a South African court is not completely ruled out.53  She provides 
however, that the domicile requirements do not prevent the pregnant surrogate mother 
from leaving the country to evade the legal consequences of the valid surrogate 
motherhood agreement.54  
Bonthuys and Broeders55 have also given an analysis of section 292(2) of the Children’s 
Act56 and conclude that the Children’s Act attempts to guard against international 
surrogacy; however they point out that the commissioning parents in the South African 
case of Ex parte WH57 were of Danish and Dutch origin. The couple had been living in 
South Africa for one year and 17 days when the judgment was handed down. They are 
of the opinion that although the commissioning parents indicated that they were 
domiciled in the country and intended to stay here permanently,58 the commissioning 
parents admitted that they had during this year of residence in South Africa already 
entered into another surrogacy agreement, which had been confirmed by a court, but 
                                                          
49
 Louw A (2007) ‘Surrogate Motherhood’ in Davel CJ and Skelton A Commentary on the Children’s Act 
38 of 2005 19-1. 
50
 Children’s Act 38 of 2005. 
51
 Louw A (2009) Acquisition of Parental Responsibilities and Rights (LLD Thesis) 337. 
52
 Section 292(2) of the Children’s Act - a court may, on good cause shown, dispense with the 
requirement that the surrogate mother and her husband/partner must be domiciled in South Africa. 
53
 Louw (2009:337). 
54
 Louw A (2007:19-8). 
55
 Bonthuys E and Broeders N (2013) “Guidelines for the Approval of Surrogate Motherhood Agreements: 
Ex Parte WH (2013) 130 The South African Law Journal 493. 
56
 Children’s Act 38 of 2005. 
57
 Ex Parte WH 2011 6 SA 514 (GNP). 
58
Ex Parte WH 2011 6 SA 514 (GNP) para 15. 
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which was unsuccessful because the surrogate mother became ill.59 Bonthuys and 
Broeders argue that for the commissioning parents to enter into two surrogacy 
agreements and have them both confirmed by the extremely busy courts within a year of 
arriving in the country appears remarkable and should have sounded alarm bells to the 
court.60 They assert that it raises questions about how the commissioning parents 
established domicile so rapidly and whether, given the existence of two surrogacy 
agreements in this time, the purpose of their residence was not reproductive tourism.61 
They argue that the judgment provides no evidence that the court considered this and 
they claim that their thinking is not an unrealistic possibility.62  Bonthuys and Broeders 
warn that given the vulnerability of surrogate mothers and the desperate desires of 
many childless couples, courts should be alive to the real potential for financial 
exploitation in surrogacy agreements and it is the court’s duty to guard against it.63 
Slabbert and Roodt64 through their own analysis of Chapter 19 of the Children’s Act 
argue that South Africa has a unilateral conflict rule due to the domicile requirement. 
They argue that the unilateral conflicts rule contained in section 29265 of the Children’s 
Act is the first specific private international law rule that exists for surrogacy in South 
Africa. The unilateral conflicts rule safeguards the opportunity for the South African 
judiciary to exercise discretion and control over surrogacy agreements. It also precludes 
the insertion of any choice of law or choice of court clauses into the agreement. Thus, 
the parties are not at liberty to select the law applicable to their agreement and the rule 
itself finds application by virtue of designating the court that is competent to confirm the 
agreement.66  
This lends predictability and certainty to the situation. However, Slabbert and Roodt 
argue that the unilateral conflicts rule displays a number of potential weaknesses. 
Firstly, it does not avoid the risk of limping situations that might arise when a surrogate 
motherhood agreement is valid in the country in which it was concluded but is invalid 
                                                          
59
Ex Parte WH 2011 6 SA 514 (GNP) para 17. 
60
 Bonthuys and Broeders (2013:493-494). 
61
 Bonthuys and Broeders (2013: 493- 494). 
62
 Bonthuys and Broeders (2013:493-494).  
63
 Bonthuys and Broeders (2013:494).  
64
 Slabbert M and Roodt C (2013) ‘South Africa’ in Trimmings K and Beaumont P (ed) International 
Surrogacy Arrangements: Legal Regulation at the International Level 325. 
65
 Baby Manji Yamada v Union of India and Anr; G (Surrogacy: Foreign Domicile) (2008) 1 FLR 1047. 
66
 Slabbert and Roodt (2013: 333). 
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elsewhere.67 Secondly, if each jurisdiction regulates the issue on its own, in a uniquely 
different way, surrogate born children may continue to be exposed to a number of legal 
and practical risks.68 They argue that in the absence of a Convention that regulates the 
legal consequences of surrogacy agreements, ordinary rules of private international law 
will apply in a situation where commissioning parent(s) who had a child by a valid 
surrogacy agreement in South Africa, settled in a foreign country.69 Thus the 
commissioning parent(s) will be the legal parents of the child when South African law is 
the applicable law unless that foreign country considers surrogacy to be contrary to its 
public policy.70 They further argue that adoption in terms of the 1993 Hague Convention 
on Protection of Children and Cooperation in respect of Intercountry Adoption may be an 
option for foreigners who do not meet the domicile requirements but who are habitually 
resident in a state party.71 
The author agrees with Slabbert and Roodt that the South African law regulating 
surrogacy displays a number of potential weaknesses and will contribute to their 
findings. The author will also contribute to the existing literature regarding the South 
African cases. However, this dissertation will differ to the extent that the author will focus 
on the possibility of South Africans being involved in an international surrogacy 
agreement, whether entered in South Africa or abroad. The authors mentioned above 
are of the view that the possibility of a South African court being seized with an 
international surrogacy agreement case is slim and if it does occur, the courts should 
refuse to confirm it. The surrogate mother will then be seen as the legal mother unless 
the commissioning parents go through the adoption process. The author will, however, 
explore how the consequences of an invalid international surrogacy agreement will 
affect the surrogate born child.   
In her recent article, Heaton72 considers the consequences of the legal position of two 
instances of international surrogacy. She firstly sets out the position where persons who 
                                                          
67
 Slabbert and Roodt (2013: 344). 
68
 Slabbert and Roodt (2013: 344). 
69
 Slabbert and Roodt (2013: 344). 
70
 Slabbert and Roodt (2013:344). 
71
 Slabbert and Roodt (2013: 344). 
72
 Heaton J (2015) ‘The pitfalls of international surrogacy: A South African family law perspective’ 
available at 
http://uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10500/19675/THRHR_February%202015international%20surrogac
y.pdf?sequence=1.  
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are not domiciled in South Africa obtain a child via surrogacy and secondly, the position 
of South Africans who obtain a child via surrogacy in a foreign country.73 
With regards to the first position, she provides that a surrogate motherhood agreement 
will be invalid and unenforceable if persons to the agreement do not comply with the 
domicile requirement in the Children’s Act.74 The surrogate mother is deemed to be the 
child’s mother for all purposes. Thus, the commissioning parents lose any rights to the 
child. However, the commissioning parents may become the child’s legal parents by 
adopting the child.75  
She is of the opinion that if the child’s birth is registered in South Africa and the 
commissioning father or both commissioning parents are not entered as the child’s 
parents, the commissioning parents might decide to obtain an order from the High Court 
granting them sole guardianship and sole care on the ground of the best interests of the 
child, before they seek to take the child to their country of origin. However, the 
Constitutional Court has held that orders granting sole guardianship and sole care of 
South African children76 to foreigners who intend to obtain an inter-country adoption 
abroad will be made only in exceptional circumstances.77 Furthermore, the Children’s 
Act provides that if a non-South African citizen applies to the High Court for an order 
granting him or her guardianship, the application must be regarded as an inter-country 
adoption for the purposes of the Convention on Inter-country Adoption.78  
                                                          
73
 Heaton (2015:34) 
74
 Heaton (2015:35). 
75
 If foreign commissioning parents want to adopt a child in South Africa, the provisions of the Children’s 
Act on inter-country adoption come into play. The Act draws a distinction between cases where the 
adoption applicants are habitually resident in a country in which The Hague Convention on Protection of 
Children and Co-operation in respect of Inter-country Adoption has entered into force and those in which it 
has not. If applicants who are habitually resident in a Convention country want to adopt a child who is 
habitually resident in South Africa, they must comply with the requirements of the Children’s Act and the 
Convention on Inter-country Adoption. First, the subsidiarity principle must be satisfied. The subsidiarity 
principle does not exclude adoption of South African child by foreigners, but requires that the possibilities 
for placing the child in South Africa must first be considered. Secondly, the Convention stipulates that 
there should be no contact between the prospective adoptive parents and the child’s parents until it has 
been determined that the prospective adoptive parents are eligible and suitable adoptive parents; that the 
child is adoptable; that the subsidiarity principle has been applied; that an inter-country adoption is in the 
child’s best interest; and that the necessary consent has been given freely and without having been 
induced by payment or compensation of any kind. Thirdly, the central authorities of both countries must 
agree to the adoption; (Heaton 2015: 35-37). 
76
 If the surrogate mother is a South African citizen, the child has South African citizenship by birth: s 2(1) 
(b) of the South African Citizenship Act 88 of 2005. Therefore the child qualifies as a South African child. 
77
 AD v DW (Centre of Child Law as Amicus Curiae; Department of Social Development as Intervening 
Party) 2008 3 SA 183 (CC); Heaton (2015:40). 
78
 Children’s Act 38 of 2005, s 25. 
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With regards to the latter position, Heaton suggests that South African law does not 
prohibit South African citizens or persons who are domiciled or resident in this country 
from participating in surrogacy in a foreign country.79 However, she claims that because 
altruistic surrogacy is legal in South Africa, there is little need for such persons to resort 
to international surrogacy.80 She claims that South African prospective commissioning 
parents are only likely to engage in international surrogacy if they do not want their 
gametes to be used for the artificial fertilisation of the surrogate mother; the 
commissioning mother can give birth but chooses not to do so; medical facilities are 
better or surrogacy is cheaper in the foreign country; the  commissioning parents want to 
access a bigger pool of potential surrogate mothers; or they are set on ordering a child 
who has specific physical or racial characteristics.81 
She suggests that if commissioning parents participated in altruistic surrogacy which 
was valid in terms of the law of the foreign country and the law of the foreign country 
automatically conferred legal parentage on them, their parental status is likely to be 
recognised in South Africa since altruistic surrogacy is permitted in this country too.82  
Heaton suggests the Courts might argue that if the commissioning parents were 
excluded as the child’s legal parents and the child’s unwilling surrogate mother was 
compelled to be the child’s parent, the child would probably end up in alternative care.83 
She asserts that such a state of affairs would not be in the best interests of the child as it 
would amount to punishing the child for the commissioning parents and the surrogate 
mother’s actions.84 The court might hold that denying recognition to the legal parentage 
of the commissioning parents would unjustifiably violate the paramountcy of the child’s 
best interest.85 She further suggests the court might also hold that denying the child 
                                                          
79
 Heaton (2015:40). 
80
 Heaton (2015:40). 
81
 Heaton (2015:41). 
82
 If the foreign surrogacy was commercial, the matter would become more complicated. As there is 
widespread international distaste for commercial surrogacy and commercial surrogacy is illegal and 
against public policy in South Africa, a South African court might withhold recognition of the 
commissioning parents’ legal parentage even if the commercial surrogacy was valid in terms of the law of 
the foreign country; Heaton (2015:41). 
83
 Heaton (2015:41). 
84
 Heaton (2015:42). 
85
 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, S 28(2) read with s 36; Heaton (2015:42) 
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parental care by commissioning parents who want to provide parental care to the child, 
unjustifiably violates the child’s constitutional right to parental care.86 
The author agrees with the above suggestion. However, the author argues that the court 
should also have the same reaction in the instance where persons who are not 
domiciled in South Africa obtained a child through a surrogacy agreement entered into in 
South Africa with a South African surrogate mother. 
Both instances affect the child is a similar way. In a situation where the surrogate mother 
cannot afford to take care of the child, the commissioning parents (whether South 
Africans or foreign nationals) are willing to provide the child with the parental care that 
the child needs. In both instances denying the recognition of legal parentage of the 
commissioning parents in respect of the child, unjustifiably violates his or her 
constitutional rights. The author will explore this argument in further detail in Chapter 3 
below by looking at international case law. 
Regarding section 292(2) of the Children’s Act,87 the author will make her own 
recommendations by examining the English legal system and case decisions in order to 
determine the meaning of ‘good cause shown’. The author will be examining the English 
legal system because the regulatory framework regarding surrogacy is similar in South 
Africa and in England. Both jurisdictions strictly regulate surrogacy.88 Additionally, 
English courts have been seized with international surrogacy agreements cases. 
1.9 Methodology 
The method employed in this study will be predominantly done by way of desktop 
literature reviews of articles on international surrogacy agreements as well as on non-
international surrogacy. Furthermore, the research consists of an extensive review of the 
reported judgments in South African involving national surrogacy agreements as well as 
on the European Court of Human Rights decision regarding international surrogacy 
agreements and the Hague Conference on Private International Law reports regarding 
international surrogacy.  Chapter 19 of the Children’s Act will also be referred to. Other 
textbooks, South African and international journals, international conventions, South 
African and foreign legislation and case law will form a large part of this research.  
                                                          
86
 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, s28 (1) (b) read with s36; Heaton (2015:42). 
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 Children’s Act 38 of 2005. 
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 Carnelley M (2012) “Ex parte WH 2011 6 SA 514 (GNP)” De Jure 180. 
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1.10 Chapter Outline 
1.10.1 Chapter 1: Introduction 
Chapter 1 will be an introduction to the history of surrogacy (international surrogacy 
agreements) and the background to the research. It also sets out important concepts, 
the aims and significance of the research. It further identifies the research question and 
provides an outline of the chapters which follow. 
 
1.10.2 Chapter 2: The South African Perspective Regarding Surrogacy 
 
The chapter will provide the history of surrogacy in South Africa and a discussion on 
Chapter 19 of the Children’s Act.89 The chapter will also consist of a discussion of the 
reported judgments decided by South African courts and the court’s interpretation of 
Chapter 19 of the Children’s Act. The focus point of this chapter is to establish the extent 
to which South African’s legal system recognises or might recognise international 
surrogacy agreements. Furthermore, the author will discuss what is referred to as a 
‘good cause shown’ as an exception to the domicile requirement in the Children’s Act90, 
and how it might be challenged or enforced in South African courts.  
1.10.3 Chapter 3: South African legislation and its influence on the Court’s 
discretion 
 
This chapter will examine South African legislation that may be applicable to the children 
born of commissioning parents (whether the commissioning parents are South Africans 
or foreign nationals) who entered into international surrogacy agreements. The 
discussion will consider the South African Citizenship Act 88 of 1995, the Birth and 
Deaths Registration Act 51 of 1992, and the Domicile Act 3 of 1992. These acts may 
provide a gateway for the commissioning parents to obtain an order granting them 
responsibilities and rights in respect of a child born from a surrogate mother. The author 
will examine how the birth registration of a child is conducted in South Africa with a view 
to examine what might occur in relation to the birth registration of a child born of 
                                                          
89
 Chapter 19 of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 regulates surrogacy in South Africa. 
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 Children’s Act 38 of 2005. 
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international surrogacy. Thereafter, the author will examine the criminal aspect of 
international surrogacy agreements. 
 
1.10.4 Chapter 4: Consequences of International Surrogacy Agreements 
 
This chapter will examine potential situations that the court may be seized with by 
observing international case law. Subsequently, the author will provide 
recommendations regarding the approach that the South African courts should consider 
when seized with an international surrogacy agreement. 
 
1.10.5 Chapter 5: Conclusion 
The final chapter will provide a summary of the research. Finally, the author will draw 
conclusions from the research and respond to the research question. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE REGARDING SURROGACY 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to lay a foundation regarding surrogate motherhood 
agreements in South Africa. A brief discussion regarding the relevant terminology will be 
presented, and thereafter the historical background of surrogacy in South Africa will be 
examined. Subsequently, the author will provide an overview of Chapter 19 of the 
Children’s Act.91 This overview serves only to contextualise the discussion of the 
provisions of the Act and does not include a comprehensive discussion of the legal 
position preceding the legislative intervention. The chapter will also consist of a 
discussion of the reported judgments decided by South African courts and the court’s 
interpretations of Chapter 19 of the Children’s Act.  
Furthermore, the author will discuss what is referred to as a ‘good cause shown’ as an 
exception to the domicile requirement, and discuss how it might be challenged or 
enforced in South African courts.  
The focal point of this chapter is to explore the framework that will assist in establishing 
the extent to which South Africa’s legal system recognises or might recognise an 
international surrogacy agreement. 
2.2. Surrogacy in South Africa 
2.2.1. Terminology 
Section 1(1) of the Children’s Act defines a surrogate motherhood agreement as 'an 
agreement between a surrogate mother and a commissioning parent whereby it is 
agreed that the surrogate mother will be artificially fertilised for the purpose of bearing a 
child for the commissioning parent, and according to the agreement, the surrogate 
mother undertakes to hand over such child to the commissioning parent upon its birth, or 
within a reasonable time thereafter, with the intention that the child concerned becomes 
the legitimate child of the commissioning parent.'92 
 
                                                          
91
 Chapter 19 of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 regulates surrogacy in South Africa. 
92
 Louw A Chapter 19: Surrogate Motherhood in Davel CJ and Skelton A Commentary on the 
Children's Act 38 of 2005 (2007), 7. 
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The commissioning parent or parents are the individual or the couple who intend(s) to 
raise the child after birth.93 The term 'surrogate' refers to the substitute or 'stand-in' 
mother who is implanted with the embryo and who takes on the role of mother until 
birth.94 
 
Two forms of surrogacy practice are recognised in South Africa, namely partial and full. 
Full surrogacy is where the surrogate has no biological relationship with the 
commissioning parent whereas, in the instance of partial surrogacy, some form of 
biological relationship exists.95 
 
Artificial insemination is described as the introduction by other than natural means of 
male gamete or gametes into the reproductive organs of a woman or by placing the 
product of a union of a male and female gamete or gametes which have been brought 
together outside the human body in the womb of that woman, an all-encompassing 
definition capable of the inclusion of many of the procedures used to give effect to 
surrogacy agreements.96 
 
2.2.2. The History of Surrogacy in South Africa 
 
Surrogacy has been available for many years in South Africa, the first recognised case 
being that of Karen Ferreira-Jorge of Tzaneen in 1987. She was a 48 year old mother 
who carried her daughter’s triplets to term.97 ‘The daughter was unable to bear children 
of her own and had been discouraged from enlisting the services of an unknown 
surrogate in fear that the surrogate may renege on her promise to give up the baby at 
birth.’98 Karen Ferreira-Jorge, after offering her assistance and after the process of 
ovarian stimulation, gave birth to triplets.99 
                                                          
93
 Lewis S (2011) ‘The Constitutional and Contractual Implications of the application of Chapter 19 of the 
Children’s Act 38 of 2005’ (LLM dissertation University of the Western Cape)13. 
94
 A surrogate mother is defined in section 1(1) of the Act as 'an adult woman who enters into a surrogate 
motherhood agreement with the commissioning parent'. It is submitted that the surrogate mother is 'the 
woman who agrees to gestate and bear the child rather than the woman who intends to rear the child'. 
Louw (2009: 335); Parliamentary Monitoring Group Report of the South African Law Commission on 
Surrogate Motherhood (1997) available at http://www.pmg.org.za (accessed on 1 June 2010), 5 - 6. 
95
 Carnelley M and Soni S (2008) “A Tale of Two Mummies” 22 Speculum Juris, 37. 
96
 Children’s Act 38 of 2005. 
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 Lewis (2011:13). 
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Previous Acts, such as the Regulations Regarding the Artificial Insemination of Persons 
and Related Matters100 and the Children’s Status Act,101 did not explicitly provide for 
surrogacy agreements; however neither Act expressly prohibited it.102 The Children’s 
Status Act103 (“CSA”) became operative less than two weeks after the Ferreira Jorge 
triplets were born.104 This legislation provided that the gestational mother and her 
husband, where he consented to the artificial insemination, were the parents of a child 
born of artificial insemination using donor sperm or eggs.105 By implication therefore, the 
gestational mother and, in the presence of spousal consent to the insemination, her 
husband, would be the parents of any child born of surrogacy. The CSA was not 
designed to deal with surrogacy, thus, the unique nature of such arrangements was not 
considered in drafting the legislation.106 The consequence was that the effect of the CSA 
was to attribute parenthood to a mother who never intended to keep the child and to a 
father whose involvement was minimal at best. This seemed untenable.107 In instances 
where donor sperm is used for artificial insemination, the donor’s rights were terminated 
by legislation.108 
 
The only means by which commissioning parents could acquire parental rights and 
responsibilities in respect of such a child was to adopt it through the conventional 
channels.109 This process was fraught with its own difficulties.110 Commissioning parents 
may prefer surrogacy arrangements to adoption for a number of reasons, inter alia, 
because: the nine month period of gestation associated with the pregnancy of a 
surrogate may be far shorter than the waiting period associated with an adoption; 
surrogacy allows for the possibility that one or both of the commissioning parents may 
                                                          
100
 Regulations Regarding the Artificial Insemination of Persons and Related Matters , Government 
Gazette (1997-10-17). 
101
 Children’s Status Act 82 of 1987 
102
International Surrogacy Forum (2015) ‘South Africa’ available at 
http://www.internationalsurrogacyforum.com/content/south-africa [accessed on 23 May 2015] 1. 
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 The Children’s Status Act 82 of 1987.  
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 Pretorius (1991) “Practical Aspects of Surrogate Motherhood” De Jure 52 58. Nicholson C and Bauling 
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De Jure 510 512. 
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 Child Status Act 82 of 1987 s 5(1)(a). 
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 Human Tissue Act 65 of 1983 s 36. 
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110
 Pretorius (1991:59); Nicholson and Bauling (2013:513). 
 
 
 
 
22 
 
be biologically related to the child; and commissioning parents are not subject to the age 
limits associated with adoptive parents.111 
 
Thus, until the advent of the Children’s Act,112 surrogacy was regulated indirectly by 
three pieces of legislation that were designed for other purposes: The Human Tissue 
Act113 (“HTA”) and its regulations, the Child Care Act114 and the CSA.115 These pieces of 
legislation were not ideal for a number of reasons, not least because the HTA was very 
restrictive in that it provided, inter alia, that only married women could be artificially 
inseminated or fertilized in vitro, effectively excluding unmarried women from acting as 
surrogates.116 
 
In 1987, the absence of specific legislation governing surrogacy led the South African 
Law Commission to begin investigating the matter. Following the circulation of a 
‘Questionnaire on Surrogate Motherhood’, the South African Law Commission published 
a working paper on the topic of surrogacy.117 The investigation by the South African Law 
Commission culminated in two documents, namely: Working Paper 38: Surrogate 
Motherhood118 and the Report on Surrogate Motherhood.119 The abovementioned were 
followed by, the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Report of the South African 
Law Commission on Surrogate Motherhood120 and the South African Law Reform 
Commission’s Project 110: Review of the Child Care Act,121 as well as the Report: 
Review of the Child Care Act.122 
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 Pretorius (1991: 54); Mills L (2010) “Certainty about surrogacy” Stell LR 429; Nicholson and Bauling 
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The underlying thread running throughout the South African Law Reform Commissions’ 
(“SALRC”) and the Ad Hoc Committee’s underlying thread was that surrogacy should 
not be banned in South Africa but must be recognised and regulated through 
legislation.123 Most importantly, in all situations of surrogacy, the best interests of the 
child must be of paramount consideration. The High Court, which is responsible for the 
confirmation of the surrogacy agreement before it may be entered into, must refuse to 
sanction such an agreement if it is not in the best interests of the child as stated in 
section 28(2) of the Constitution. 
In 2003, after a five year period of consultation with organisations representing the 
children’s sector, the SALRC tabled a draft bill aimed at enhancing the rights of 
vulnerable and poor children, addressing the increase in child abuse and neglect and 
providing better care for all children. In June 2005, the Children’s Bill was approved by 
the National Assembly124 in line with South Africa’s obligations as a party to the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child (“UNCRC”) (ratified in 1995) and the African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (“ACRWC”) (ratified in 2000).  
The Children’s Bill, in the form of Chapter 20, was the first legislation to openly regulate 
surrogate motherhood and establish surrogacy as a legally recognised procedure of 
assisted reproduction. However when the Children’s Bill was promulgated into law, 
surrogate motherhood agreements were governed by Chapter 19 of the Children’s Act. 
In short, Chapter 19 provides that: 
i. surrogacy agreements which are sanctioned by the High Court are valid and 
enforceable between parties;125 
ii. the commissioning parent(s) are recognised as the legal parent(s) from date of 
birth;126 
                                                          
123
 South African Law Commission’s: Report: Review of the Child Care Act December 2002. 
124
 On 1 July 2007, the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 had been passed by Parliament and partially 
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by the State President on 14 March 2008 after being concluded in Parliament in November 2007. Sloth- 
Nielsen J (2008) “A Developing Dialogue – Children’s Rights, Children’s Law and Economics: Surveying 
Experiences from Southern and Eastern African Law Reform Processes” Electronic Journal of 
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iii. the child born of the agreement is for legal purposes the child of the 
commissioning parents; and127 
iv. surrogacy in exchange for commercial gain is prohibited.128 
 
2.3. Discussion on Chapter 19 of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 
 
The provisions contained in Chapter 19 for the first time created a statutory scheme for 
the regulation of surrogacy agreements in South Africa. 
The formalities for a valid surrogacy agreement are provided for in Section 292 of the 
Act. Section 292 provides: 
‘(1) No surrogate motherhood agreement is valid unless- 
a) the agreement is in writing and is signed by all the parties thereto; 
b) the   agreement is entered into in the Republic; 
c) at least one of the commissioning parents, or where the commissioning parent is 
a single person, that person at the time of entering into the agreement domiciled 
in the Republic; 
d) the surrogate mother and her husband or partner, if any, are at the time of 
entering into the agreement domiciled in the Republic; and 
e) the agreement is confirmed by the High Court within whose are of jurisdiction the 
commissioning parent or parents are domiciled or habitually resident.129 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
126
 In other countries such as the UK there is a default legal assumption that the women giving birth to that 
child is the child's legal mother. 
127
 Section 297(1)(a) of the Act provides that 'any child born of a surrogate mother in accordance with the 
agreement is for all purposes the child of the commissioning parent or parents from the moment of birth of 
the child concerned'. Louw A (2009:356). However, section 298(1) of the Children’s Act provides that a 
surrogate mother who is also a genetic parent of the child concerned may, at any time prior to the lapse of 
a period of sixty days after the birth of the child, terminate the surrogate motherhood agreement by filing 
written notice with the court. The effect of this as provided for in section 298(3) is that the surrogate 
mother incurs no liability to the commissioning parents for exercising her rights of termination in terms of 
this section, except for compensation for any payments made by the commissioning parents in terms of 
section 301.   
128
 Section 301 of the Act prohibits payment in respect of surrogacy agreements. Section 305 stipulates 
the possible offences and respective punishments. The surrogate may only enter the agreement for purely 
altruistic reasons and the only compensation she is entitled to receive from the commissioning parents is 
compensation in respect of reasonable expenses. Carnelley M and Soni S (2008:41); Louw A (2009:350). 
129
 Habitual residence is not defined in the South African legislation. The term habitual residence should 
be given its ordinary natural meaning with the reference to all facts of the particular case. The word 
habitual implies a stable territorial link- which may be achieved through length of stay or through evidence 
of a particularly close tie between the person and the place (Du Toit C (2009) ‘The Hague Convention on 
the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction’ in Boezaart T (ed) Child Law in South Africa). In Senior 
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(2) A court may, on good cause shown, dispose with the requirement set in subsection 
(1) (d). 
Section 293 (1) provides that the written consent of all parties to the agreement must be 
obtained i.e. the husband, wife or partner of the commissioning parent and the surrogate 
mother, before the court may confirm the agreement. Where such consent is 
unreasonably withheld and the husband, wife or partner is not the genetic parent of the 
child, the court may confirm such agreement.130  
 
Section 294 provides that a surrogate motherhood agreement is only valid if it is to be 
effected by the use of the gametes of either both the commissioning parents or at least 
one of the commissioning parents in cases where the latter is not possible. The Ad Hoc 
Committee felt that in cases where the single commissioning parent or both 
commissioning parents are infertile, adoption of a child will adequately serve the needs 
of the person or couple concerned.131 The SALC argued that it is in the best interests of 
the child to promote the bond between the child and the commissioning parents, and 
that it will also ‘restrict undesirable practices such as shopping around with a view to 
creating children with particular characteristics’.132 This section however has been 
challenged in the matter of AB and Another v Minister of Social Development as Amicus 
Curiae: Centre for Child Law133 on the grounds that section 294 infringes the rights of 
parents who cannot donate their own gametes. Basson J declared the section to be 
unconstitutional and thus invalid. However, the judgment must still be confirmed by the 
Constitutional Court. This case will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter. 
 
The requirements for a valid surrogate motherhood agreement by the High Court are set 
out in section 295. The section provides that the commissioning parent(s) must be 
permanently and irreversibly unable to give birth to a child.134 Thus, at least one 
commissioning parent must be infertile. The commissioning parents must be suitable 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
Family Advocate, Cape Town v Houtman 2004 (6) SA 274 (C) para [10], the court stated that one has to 
look at whether the person has a factual link with the requesting state, culturally, socially and linguistically 
to determine whether it was the person’s country of habitual residence. It must be noted that this case 
dealt with the international abduction of a child. 
130
 Children’s Act 38 of 2005 s 293(3). 
131
 Louw A (2012:19-13). 
132
 SALC Project 65 para 8.2.6. 
133
 AB and Another v Minister of Social Development As Amicus Curiae: Centre for Child Law 2016 (2) 27 
(GP). 
134
 Children’s Act s 295(a). 
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persons to accept the parenthood of the child to be conceived and understand the legal 
consequences the agreement.135  
 
With regard to the suitability of the commissioning parent(s) to accept parenthood of the 
child, the Ad Hoc Committee136 concurred with the SALC’s recommendation137 that all 
parties to a surrogate agreement should be subjected to a strict screening process 
before the agreement is implemented, and to a continuous process of counselling before 
and after the conclusion and implementation of the agreement. This recommendation 
was not, however, incorporated into the Children’s Act. 
 
The surrogate mother must also be competent, suitable to act as a surrogate mother 
and must also understand the legal consequences of the agreement.138 The court must 
confirm that the agreement has been entered into for altruistic not commercial 
reasons.139 The surrogate mother must have had at least one pregnancy and viable 
delivery and a living child of her own.140 The agreement must include specific provisions 
for the child that are above all in his or her best interests.141 
 
The recommendation of strict screening of parties to a surrogate motherhood agreement 
applies with even more force to the screening of the surrogate mother in order to ensure 
her suitability as a surrogate mother.142 The successful execution of the surrogate 
agreement is to a large extent dependent upon the surrogate mother being physically 
and psychologically suited to act as a surrogate mother.143 
 
Section 296 provides that the artificial fertilisation of the surrogate mother may not take 
place before the agreement is confirmed by the court and/or after the lapse of the 18 
months from the date of confirmation of agreement.144 Such fertilisation must be done in 
                                                          
135
 Children’s Act s 295(b)(i)-(iii). 
136
 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee para F6. 
137
 SALC Project 65 para 8.2.3. 
138
 Children’s Act s295(c)(i)-(iii). 
139
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140
 Children’s Act s295(v)-(vii). 
141
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accordance with the provisions of the National Health Act 61 of 2003.145 The 
regulations146 to the National Health Act,147 provide for the removal and storage of 
gametes by competent persons at ‘authorised institutions’, the creation and keeping of 
gametes donor and recipient files, the requirement of artificial fertilisation and embryo 
transfer, the reporting of births and ownership of gametes, zygotes and embryos. 
 
Section 297 (1) provides for the status of a child born of the agreement. It provides that 
for all purposes, a child born in terms of a valid surrogacy agreement is deemed the 
child of the commissioning parent(s) and the surrogate mother has no right of 
parenthood or care of the child, nor a right to contact with the child unless otherwise 
provided for.148 Thus no claim for maintenance or of succession can arise against the 
surrogate mother or her family.149 
Section 297 (2) provides that if any surrogate motherhood agreement does not comply 
with the provisions of the Act, it will be invalid. Any child born as a result of any action 
taken in execution of such an arrangement is for all purpose deemed to be the child of 
the woman that gave birth to the child. 
Section 298 (1) provides: in the case of partial surrogacy, a surrogate mother may at 
any time prior to a period of 60 days after the birth of the child terminate the agreement 
through notice to the court. The court must be satisfied that she has done so voluntarily 
understanding the effects thereof; and she will then only be liable for compensation for 
prior payments made in respect of her expenses by the commissioning parents.150 
Section 299 provides that if the agreement is terminated before the birth of the child, the 
child shall be deemed as an offspring of the surrogate mother.151 No rights vest in the 
commissioning parents, unless they are acquired through adoption processes and no 
claim for maintenance may arise.152 If the agreement is terminated after birth, all 
parental rights which the commissioning parents may have obtained are terminated and 
                                                          
145
 Children’s Act 38 of 2005 s 296(2). 
146
Regulations Relating to Artificial Fertilisation of Persons published in Government Gazette 35099 of 2 
March 2012. 
147
 61 of 2003. 
148
 Children’s Act 38 of 2005, s 297(1)(a)-(d). 
149
 Children’s Act 38 of 2005, s 297(1)(f). 
150
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vest in the surrogate. Effectively, the implication of a partial surrogacy agreement is that 
the position of parentage is held in abeyance. The surrogate is in fact the legal mother of 
the child to be born of the agreement pending her decision to renege on or abide by the 
agreement.  
Section 300 provides that the surrogate agreement may be terminated through a 
termination of the pregnancy carried out in terms of the Choice on Termination of 
Pregnancy Act153 and the decision to undergo an abortion lies solely with the surrogate 
mother.  
Section 301 provides that all payments in respect of surrogacy agreements are 
prohibited. No surrogate agreement may be entered into with the result that a party 
agrees to receive or to give a reward or compensation in money or in kind.154 The only 
forms of compensation that will be permitted will be those which are directly related to 
those expenses incurred in the fertilisation and pregnancy of the surrogate, the birth of 
the child and the confirmation of the agreement by the court; any loss of earnings 
suffered by the surrogate as a result of the agreement; and insurance for the surrogate 
in cases of death or disability.155  
Section 301 (3) provides for the reasonable compensation for any person who renders 
bona fide legal and medical assistance with a view to the confirmation of a surrogate 
agreement or in the execution of such an agreement. 
Section 302 provides that no person may artificially fertilise or render such assistance in 
an artificial fertilisation unless the agreement has been confirmed by the court. No 
person may in any way for, or with a view to, compensation, make known that any 
person is or may be willing to enter into a surrogate mother agreement. 
Section 303 prohibits any person from artificially fertilising a woman ‘in the execution of 
a surrogate motherhood agreement or render assistance in such artificial fertilisation 
unless that artificial fertilisation is authorised by a court in terms of the provisions of this 
Act’.  
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 Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996. 
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Section 305 provides that a person who contravenes the provisions of s 301, 302 and 
303 mentioned above, is guilty of an offence and liable to a fine or imprisonment for a 
period not exceeding 10 years, or both a fine and imprisonment.156 This section will be 
discussed further under the heading “The Criminal Aspect of International Surrogacy 
Agreements” in Chapter three. 
Taken as a whole, Chapter 19 indicates that the legislature has been cautious and 
requires extensive control over the surrogacy process. However with the lack of 
regulations, interpreting the legislation has been found to be quite problematic. 
2.4. Reported South African cases concerning Surrogacy 
 
Cases relating to surrogate motherhood agreements demonstrate that the Children’s Act 
is not as clear as it could have been regarding what is required of the parties to such 
agreements. Some of the requirements that give rise to uncertainty will now be 
considered in more detail. The discussion will incorporate a brief evaluation of surrogacy 
judgments and recommendations and reviews regarding these judgements.  
2.4.1. Ex Parte Applications for the Confirmation of three Surrogate 
Motherhood Agreements 2011 6 SA 22 (GSJ) 
 
The first reported judgment was Ex Parte Applications for the Confirmation of three 
Surrogate Motherhood Agreements.157 In this case the court postponed the applications 
sine die to give the applicants an opportunity to rectify their applications to enable the 
court to consider the matters on their merits. The court held that for a surrogacy 
agreement to be valid there must be complete and full compliance with all the provisions 
set out in Chapter 19 of the Children’s Act.158 Failure to do so would render the 
agreement invalid, resulting in the wishes of the parties not materialising.159 The court 
noted that each surrogacy arrangement is unique and the agreement should be adapted 
according to the circumstances and the persons involved. Apart from the agreement 
itself, parties have to provide the court with the relevant evidence to ensure that they 
                                                          
156
 Section 305(1)(b) read with s305(6). A person convicted of this offence more than once can be 
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 Ex Parte Applications for the Confirmation of three Surrogate Motherhood Agreements 2011 6 SA 22 
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 Children’s Act 38 of 2005. 
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(and their circumstances) meet the statutory requirements.160 The judgment did not deal 
with any social or ethical arguments regarding surrogacy, but the judgment provided 
practical guidance, including: 
 Surrogate motherhood agreements are generally not regarded as urgent 
matters;161 
 The court’s confirmation of the agreement is not a mere rubber stamp and will not 
be granted as a matter of course;162 
 The court, as upper guardian of all minor children, has a constitutional and 
international law duty to ensure that the interests of the children are paramount 
and the court takes this duty seriously;163 
 The success of an application will depend on the evidence provided to the court 
of the facts on which the application is based, to enable the court to make the 
statutorily required conclusions;164 and 
 Any and all expert reports must be in depth, reliable and provide a detailed 
factual exposition to support any recommendations made by the expert. These 
facts and evidence must relate to the general and specific appropriateness of the 
relevant parties, their financial resources and emotional stability and irreversibility 
of the sterility of the commissioning parents.165 
 
2.4.2. Ex Parte WH 2011 6 SA 514 (GNP) 
 
In Ex Parte WH,166 a confirmation application was brought by a male same-sex couple 
allegedly domiciled in South Africa. The commissioning couple appeared to have met 
the statutory requirements.167 However, there was no information before the court 
concerning the origin of the donor-egg, except that it was not to be that of the surrogate 
mother.168 Unfortunately, the judgment is silent on the identity of the sperm donor. This 
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 Carnelley and Soni (2011:30). 
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165
 Ex Parte 2011 para 17 . 
166
 Ex Parte WH 2011 6 SA 514 (GNP) 
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any compensation for services rendered be provided, either to the surrogate herself or the intermediary, 
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is unfortunate because, prior to the case of AB and Another v Minister of Social 
Development as Amicus Curiae: Centre for Child Law (discussed below), the Act 
required that at least one of the commissioning parents must be genetically linked to the 
child; if the court did not have this evidence before them, and if it is found that none of 
the commissioning parents are genetically linked to the child, the agreement would have 
been invalid.169  
 
Furthermore, the couple were of Dutch and Danish nationality respectively. They had 
been staying in South Africa for just over a year. Unfortunately, the court did not 
investigate in any detail whether the couple was domiciled in South Africa. The court 
simply accepted their allegation that they were domiciled in South Africa in spite of the 
fact that, for a foreign national to be domiciled or habitually resident in South Africa, they 
are obligated to follow certain requirements.170 
 
Furthermore, even though the Court confirmed the application, seeking recognition of 
the commissioning parents’ parental status in their countries of birth (in this case Dutch 
and Danish), turned out to be a problem.171 In the Netherlands the courts have refused 
to recognise legal parentage established in terms of foreign birth certificates where no 
mother is mentioned on the birth certificate.172 A Danish citizenship is not acquired by 
the child born out of marriage between a Danish father and a non-Danish mother.173 
Danish law, therefore, would make it impossible for the commissioning father in the Ex 
Parte WH case174 to apply for Danish citizenship on behalf of the child born to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
between surrogate and any intermediary or any other person who is involved in the process be furnished; 
and information as to whether any of the commissioning parents have been charged with or convicted of a 
violent crime or a crime of a sexual nature; Sloth- Nielsen J (2013) “Surrogacy, South African Style” 
available at http://repository.uwc.ac.za/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10566/1275/Sloth-
NielsenSurrogacySouthAfricanStyle2013.pdf?sequence=1 .  
169
 Children’s Act 38 of 2005, s 294. 
170
 Applications for permanent residency in South Africa are considered in terms of section 25 (Permanent 
Residence); section 26 (Direct Residency Permits) and section 27 (Residency on other grounds Permits) 
of the Immigration Act 13 of 2002 and read with Regulation 23 and 24 of the Immigration Regulations 
2014. Section 1(2) of the Domicile Act 3 of 1992 provides: ‘A domicile of choice shall be acquired by a 
person when he is lawfully present at a particular place and has the intention to settle there for an 
indefinite period.’ 
171
 Louw (2013) “Surrogacy in South Africa: Should we reconsider the current approach?” 76 THRHR 587. 
172
 Louw (2013:587). 
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 Vink and De Groot (2010) “Birthright citizenship: Trends and regulations in Europe” EUDO Citizens 
Observatory and Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies in collaboration with Edinburgh University 
Law School 11. 
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surrogate mother. Louw175 suggests that the only way in which the commissioning 
parents in the Ex Parte WH case could overcome the problem was to adopt the child.176 
For the commissioning parents in the Ex Parte WH case, the enabling surrogacy 
legislation in South Africa could thus not secure their parental status in their countries of 
origin.177 
 
The author submits that it is unfortunate that the court in Ex Parte WH failed to provide 
guidelines on how to investigate whether the commissioning couple was domiciled in 
South Africa. The problem with this is that the court ignored the statutory requirements 
for a valid surrogacy motherhood agreement in South Africa and accepted the word of 
the couple that the requirement has been met. The couple in Ex Parte WH might have 
not been domiciled in South Africa. This lays a good foundation for my argument that 
South Africa should consider the possibility of a foreign national couple entering into a 
surrogacy motherhood agreement post-confirmation by the Court, or foreign nationals 
using South Africa’s surrogacy services or South Africans going abroad. 
 
2.4.3. Ex Parte MS and Others 2014 (3) SA 415 (GP) 
 
In Ex Parte MS178 the court was seized with a retrospective confirmation application of a 
surrogate motherhood agreement concluded after fertilisation. Section 296(1), read with 
sections 303 and 305 of the Act, provides that the artificial fertilisation of the surrogate 
mother may not take place before the agreement is confirmed by the court. A person 
who renders assistance or artificially fertilises a woman without the court having 
authorised the artificial fertilisation, commits an offence and, if convicted, is punishable 
with a fine or imprisonment for a period of ten years or both.179 The issue before the 
court was whether it was possible for the court to confirm a surrogate motherhood 
agreement after fertilisation.180 
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 Louw A (2013:564). 
176
 Louw (2013:587); The necessity of obtaining an adoption order is deemed ironic because this is exactly 
what the Children’s Act sought to avoid by the regulation of surrogacy in Ch 19. Vink and De Groot (2010) 
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Keightley AJ held that the Act did not provide a definite answer to this question.181 
Although the Act expressly prohibits artificial fertilisation of the surrogate mother prior to 
the surrogacy agreement being confirmed by the court, the Act was silent as to how the 
validity of such an agreement is affected by non-compliance.182 Thus, in the opinion of 
the court, it had the discretion to confirm a surrogate motherhood agreement in 
circumstances where the fertilisation occurred before the confirmation.183 It was also 
held that it would be contrary to section 28(2) of the Constitution184 (the best interests of 
the child) if the court did not have the discretion to retrospectively confirm such 
surrogate motherhood agreement. Therefore the court had to retain the discretion to do 
so if the court was satisfied that it would be in the best interest of the child to be born.185 
 
Ex Parte MS is another example of how South African courts tend to ignore the basic 
statutory requirements. It also proves once again that guidelines are needed for the 
interpretation of the Act. Furthermore, it also shows that the court may be seized with 
surrogacy agreements that will not be valid because they do not meet the requirements.   
   
2.4.4 AB and Another v Minister of Social Development; as Amicus Curiae:  
Centre for Child Law 2016 (2) 27 (GP) 
 
The applicants in this matter challenged the constitutional validity of the provisions of 
section 294 of the Act on the grounds that the genetic link requirement violates the first 
applicant’s rights to equality, dignity, reproductive, health care, autonomy and privacy. 
The applicants submitted that, although it is accepted that most people prefer to use 
their own gametes in order to establish a genetic link with a child, there is no justification 
for the limitation of these rights on this basis.186 The respondent submitted that the 
requirement that a genetic link must exist between the commissioning parent and the 
child is not unconstitutional and that the provision should not be declared invalid.187 
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184
 The Constitution of Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
185
 Ex Parte MS and Others 2014 (3) SA 415 (GP) para 55. 
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The genetic link requirement made it impossible for the first applicant to conclude a 
surrogate motherhood agreement and consequently made it impossible for her to 
become a parent. The first applicant suffers from a medical condition resulting in her 
being unable to give birth to a child and she is also unable to donate her own gametes. 
She is neither married nor is she in a sexual relationship with a person who is able to 
donate gametes.188 
 
Basson J argued that the different viewpoints of the parties of what is meant by 
surrogacy lies at the heart of the dispute.189 She submitted that the applicants regard the 
concept of surrogacy to mean the provision of an opportunity to persons who cannot 
give birth themselves to become parents irrespective of whether the child will be 
genetically related to the parents or not. The respondent regards the concept of 
surrogacy to mean an opportunity to persons who cannot give birth themselves to have 
a genetically related child.190 
 
The respondent identified nine purported purposes of the genetic link requirement in 
support of its view that there is a rational nexus between the purpose and the genetic 
link requirement. They are the following: the best interests of the child; prevention of the 
commodification and trafficking of children; promotion of the child’s rights to know its 
genetic origin and to information about the process involved in his or her conception; 
prevention of the creation of so called “designer” children and of shopping around for 
gametes with the intention of creating children with particular characteristics; prevention 
of commercial surrogacy; prevention of the potential exploitation of surrogate mothers; 
prevention of circumvention of adoption law; promotion of adoption and prevention of a 
negative impact on the adoption process.191 
 
Basson J discussed the reasons advanced by the applicants as to why they are of the 
view that the genetic link requirements in the context of surrogacy amount to 
infringement of rights. She submits that the genetic link requirement clearly constituted 
discrimination on the basis of equality,192 human dignity,193 reproductive autonomy,194 
                                                          
188
 AB v Minister of Social Development para 9. 
189
 AB v Minister of Social Development para 31. 
190
 AB v Minister of Social Development para 31. 
191
 AB v Minister of Social Development para 62. 
192
 AB v Minister of Social Development para 76. 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
privacy,195 and access to health care.196  Judge Basson submitted that the genetic link 
requirement violates person’s human rights on a very personal and intimate level.197 She 
further submitted that the respondent failed to prove that there is a rational connection 
between the differentiation in question and the legitimate governmental purpose it is 
designed to achieve.198 
 
Basson J declared section 294 to be inconsistent with the Constitution and therefore 
invalid. She was also of the view that the declaration of invalidity of the genetic link 
should not be suspended to provide the legislature time to investigate the matter and 
attempt to obtain public opinion. The case was set down for confirmation of the 
declaration of constitutional invalidity in February 2016. At the time of submission of this 
thesis, judgment from the Constitutional Court was still awaited.199 
 
Lewis, through her own analysis of section 294 and by applying section 36 of the 
Constitution,200 submitted that the limitation caused by section 294 is unjustifiable and 
without a constitutionally acceptable purpose, as this provision denies infertile persons 
the right to make decisions regarding reproduction.201 She further submits that the 
Children’s Act expressly discriminates against infertile persons and such discrimination 
is unfair.202 
 
This view is support by Van Niekerk,203 who is of the opinion that the section limits an 
infertile person’s right to make decisions regarding reproduction in the context of 
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 AB v Minister of Social Development para 89. 
194
 AB v Minister of Social Development para 92. 
195
 AB v Minister of Social Development para 95. 
196
 AB v Minister of Social Development para 99. 
197
 AB v Minister of Social Development para 102. 
198
 AB v Minister of Social Development para 87. 
199
 This dissertation was submitted on the 09
th
 of November 2016. 
200
 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s 36 provides that “the rights in the Bill of Rights 
may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into 
account all relevant factors, including – a) The nature of the right; b) The importance of the purpose of the 
limitation; c) The nature and extent of the limitation; d) The relation between the limitation and its purpose; 
and e) Less restrictive ways to achieve the purpose.” 
201
 Lewis (2011: 109). 
202
 Lewis (2011:109) 
203
 Van Niekerk C (2015) “Section 294 of the Children’s Act: Do Roots Really Matter? Vol 18 No 2 PER 
available at http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/pelj.v18i2.11. 
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surrogacy where the person is incapable of providing a genetic link.204 She further 
submits that the limitation of such a person’s right is unreasonable and unjustifiable 
given the nature and extent of the limitation.205 She reasons that the relationship 
between the limitation and its purpose is tenuous at best, and that there are less 
restrictive ways to accomplish the purpose behind the limitation.206 
 
Despite the fact that the case law has cleared up some uncertainties regarding the law 
of surrogacy, many legal problems remain. The courts are yet to be asked to settle a 
dispute arising from the termination of a surrogate motherhood agreement and other 
disputes that may arise from a surrogacy agreement. The courts’ attempt at providing 
guidance to parties who wish to make use of surrogacy as a way of procreation in some 
of the above cases is laudable, more so considering the fact that there are as yet no 
regulations to Chapter 19 of the Children’s Act.207  
 
2.5. What is referred to a ‘good cause shown’ in section 292(2) of the Children’s 
Act 38 of 2005? How would it be challenged or enforced in South Africa? 
 
Section 292(1)(b) of the Act provides that no surrogate agreement is valid unless ‘the 
agreement is entered into in the Republic’ and in accordance with section 292(1)(d): ‘the 
surrogate mother and her husband or partner, if any, are at the time of entering into the 
agreement domiciled in the Republic...’. However according to section 292 (2), ‘[a] court 
may, on good cause shown, dispose with the requirements set out in subsection 1(d)’. 
‘Good cause’ generally means a legally sufficient reason for a court action or ruling. The 
definition varies according to the circumstances of each case.208 Louw209 provides that 
with regards to section 292(2) of the Act, commissioning parent(s) may use a relative as 
a surrogate mother.  
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 Van Niekerk (2015:13). 
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 Van Niekerk (2015:13). 
206
 Van Niekerk (2015:13). 
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 It is noteworthy that Regulations have been proposed in amendments drafted by a team from the 
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The author of this dissertation is of the view that the aforementioned exception is a 
gateway to confusion and uncertainty regarding international surrogacy in South Africa. 
Currently, there is neither case law nor are there guidelines explaining the rationale for 
the exception or the circumstances in which it might apply. The author submits that the 
exception is also a gateway to the possibility of international surrogacy agreements 
being entered into South Africa. Therefore, the author places emphasis on how 
important it is for South African legislature and courts to discuss this possibility and how 
to protect the best interests of the children born from surrogate agreements that had not 
been granted pre-authorisation by our courts. 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to lay a foundation regarding surrogate 
motherhood agreements and legislation in South Africa. Additionally, the discussion was 
intended to lay a foundation for the examination of the framework needed to establish 
the extent to which South African’s legal system recognises or might recognise an 
international surrogacy agreement. 
The first part of this chapter dealt with the legislative history of surrogacy prior to 2003. It 
was noted that due to the highly publicised case of the Ferreira- Jorge triplets of 
Tzaneen in 1987 and the realisation that surrogacy was being practiced in South Africa, 
the SALC recognised a need for legislation that would clarify the positions of all parties 
to a surrogacy agreement, and most importantly, elucidate the legal status of children 
born of these agreements.  
 
Subsequently, the author provided an overview of Chapter 19 of the Children’s Act. The 
overview served only to contextualise the discussion of the provisions of the Act. The 
author then discussed the reported surrogacy judgments and came to the conclusion 
that these cases demonstrate that the Children’s Act is unclear regarding what is 
required of the parties to such agreements. However, despite the fact that the cases 
have cleared up some uncertainties regarding the law of surrogacy, many legal 
problems remain. The courts are yet to be seized to settle a dispute arising from many 
aspects of a surrogate motherhood agreement. The courts attempt to provide guidance 
to parties who wish to make use of surrogacy as a way of procreation in some of the 
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above cases is laudable, more so considering the fact that the  there are no regulations 
to the Children’s Act relevant to surrogacy. 
 
The chapter further explores the ‘good cause shown’ clause provided for in section 
292(2) of the Act. “Good cause shown” was suggested to mean that the commissioning 
parents could ask a foreign relative to be a surrogate mother. The author submitted that 
this exception is a gateway to confusion and uncertainty regarding international 
surrogacy in South Africa.  
 
In the next chapter, the author will explore situations that a South African court might be 
seized with by making reference to international case law. The next chapter will also 
examine South African legislation that may be applicable to the children born of 
commissioning parents who entered into international surrogacy agreements such as 
the South African Citizenship Act 88 of 1995,210 the Birth and Deaths Registration Act211 
and the Domicile Act.212 Thereafter, the author will provide recommendations to what 
approach courts should consider when seized with an international surrogacy 
agreement. 
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CHAPTER 3: SOUTH AFRICAN LEGISLATION AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE 
COURT’S DISCRETION 
3.1 Introduction 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa provides that ‘every child has the right 
to a name and nationality from birth’.213 The right is not restricted to South African 
citizens but must be able to be enjoyed by all children in South Africa irrespective of 
their parents’ nationality and legal status in South Africa.214  
 
In many instances, there may be uncertainty about who the child’s legal parents are or 
which nationality the child should be accorded. This chapter will examine South African 
legislation that may be applicable to the children born of commissioning parents 
(whether the commissioning parents are South Africans or foreign nationals) who 
entered into international surrogacy agreements. The discussion will consider the South 
African Citizenship Act 88 of 1995, the Birth and Deaths Registration Act 51 of 1992, 
and the Domicile Act 3 of 1992. These acts may provide a gateway for the 
commissioning parents to obtain an order granting them responsibilities and rights in 
respect of a child born from a surrogate mother. The author will examine how the birth 
registration of a child is conducted in South Africa with a view to examine what might 
occur in relation to the birth registration of a child born of international surrogacy. 
Furthermore, the author will examine the criminal aspect of international surrogacy.  
3.2 Legal framework on birth registration, nationality and statelessness in 
South Africa 
The following are the mechanisms in place to promote birth registration, access to 
citizenship, to protect stateless children and to resolve undetermined citizenship status 
in South Africa.  There are limited legal mechanisms in place for the protection of 
stateless children or children at risk of statelessness in South Africa. However, the 
legislation discussed below covers some protection needs of children. The section 
serves only as a brief overview of the law that may be applicable to children born from a 
surrogate motherhood agreement.  
                                                          
213
 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, s 28(1) (a). 
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3.2.1 South African Constitution 
The Bill of Rights, at Chapter 2 of the South African Constitution establishes the rights 
that constitute fundamental human rights in South Africa. A number of provisions of the 
Bill of Rights apply to both citizens and non-citizens equally, protecting all individuals' 
innate humanity regardless of their nationality or status in the country.215  
 
The Constitution states in section 28(1) (a): ‘Every child has the right to a name and a 
nationality from birth’216. This right exists for citizens and non-citizens alike. It is 
noteworthy that the Constitution protects the right to nationality from birth – it goes 
further than even the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, which only 
protects the child's right to acquire a nationality (unless the child is stateless at birth, in 
which case the ACRWC protects the child's right to acquire the nationality of the birth 
country).217 
 
Section 28(2) of the Constitution218 requires that a child’s best interests have paramount 
importance in every matter concerning the child. This was enunciated in S v M (Centre 
for Child Law as Amicus Curiae),219 amongst other cases, where the court held that the 
paramountcy principle, read with the right to family care, requires that the interests of the 
children who stand to be affected receive due consideration. In terms of the African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and art 9 of the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, the four principal values of the Convention are – non-discrimination; best 
interests of the child standard (incorporated in the Children’s Act); right to life; survival 
and development; and respect for the views of the child. Thus, South Africa not only has 
a constitutional obligation but also an international obligation to provide these children 
with the right to nationality so they can experience life and develop as human beings in 
South Africa. 
                                                          
215
 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s9. 
216
 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, s 28(1) (a). 
217
 Article VI of the 1999 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child; George J and Elphick R 
(2014) Promoting Citizenship and Preventing Statelessness in South Africa: A Practitioner’s Guide 
available at http://www.pulp.up.ac.za/pdf/2014_13/2014_13.pdf 20. 
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In the case of Minister of Welfare and Population Development v Fitzpatrick220 the court 
declared s 18(4) (f) of the Child Care Act221 invalid because it prohibited the adoption of 
a South African child by non-citizens. The court found the law too restrictive because it 
limited the best interests of the child, which would sometimes be achieved through being 
adopted by non-South African parents. As Goldstone J pointed out in Fitzpatrick,222 s 
28(1) is not exhaustive of children’s rights: 
‘Section 28(2) requires that a child’s best interest have paramount importance in every 
matter concerning the child. The plain meaning of the words clearly indicates that the 
reach of s 28(2) cannot be limited to the rights enumerated in s 28(1) and s 28(2) must 
be interpreted to extend beyond these provisions. It creates a right that is independent 
of those specified in s 28(1).’223 
The author submits that a court, if faced with an international surrogate motherhood 
agreement (which is seemingly prohibited on the face of the Children’s Act), will take 
into account the child’s best interests by weighing the circumstances of the surrogate 
mother and the commissioning parents before declaring the international surrogate 
motherhood agreement invalid and enforceable. There may be many situations in which 
the surrogate mother cannot afford to care for the child. The child would then be placed 
in alternative care. Yet, there are persons who are willing to take care of all the child’s 
needs and protect the child. The court might find that by denying recognition of legal 
parentage to the commissioning parents might unjustifiably violate the child’s right to 
parental care and right to a nationality or citizenship.224  
The Constitution protects the right of every child to ‘a’ nationality, not necessarily to 
South African nationality.225 The Constitution also prohibits deprivation of nationality, in 
section 20 where it states simply: ‘No citizen may be deprived of citizenship’ (emphasis 
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 Child Care Act 74 of 1983. 
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 Minister of Welfare and Population Development v Fitzpatrick and others, [2000] (3) SA 422 (CC). 
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added). However, the South African Citizenship Act226 is more explicit in section 2(2), 
which provides that any person born on the territory who is stateless is entitled to South 
African citizenship by birth, provided the birth is registered in accordance with South 
African law.227 Section 2(2) will be discussed in further detail below.  
 
3.2.2 South African Citizenship Act 88 of 1995 
The South African Citizenship Act 88 of 1995 (“Citizenship Act”), governs the acquisition 
and loss of South African citizenship. South African citizenship by birth is accessible 
through this Act to persons born on the territory to a citizen228 or to permanent 
residents;229 persons born abroad to a South African citizen;230 and people born on the 
territory without access to any other nationality.231 Citizenship by descent is given to 
children adopted by South African citizens.232  
 
The following citizens must first register their birth ‘in accordance with the Births and 
Deaths Registration Act’ 51 of 1992 (“BDRA”) in order to access citizenship – namely: 
(1) those born on the territory who are stateless,233 
(2) those born on the territory, to parents admitted for permanent residence,234 who live 
in the Republic until age 18,235 
(3) those adopted by a South African citizen,236 and 
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 South African Citizenship Act 88 of 1995. 
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 The importance of one’s nationality only increases when a person reaches adulthood. An identity 
document becomes necessary to do just about anything to improve one’s position in life, such as 
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 South African Citizenship Act 88 of 1995, s 2(1) (b). 
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(4) those born on the territory to parents not admitted to the Republic for permanent 
residence who live in the Republic until age 18.’237 This category is discussed under the 
heading “Recent amendments” below. 
 
A person born in or outside South Africa to a South African parent does not need to 
register his or her birth in order for citizenship to be granted by operation of law. 
Previously, birth registration was required for those born outside the country to be a 
citizen.238  However, this legal fact does not change the administrative requirements 
enforced by South African government, which does not in practice recognise citizens 
born abroad until they have completed the foreign birth registration process in terms of 
the BDRA. The birth registration provisions will be discussed in the next section. 
Section 2(2) of the South African Citizenship Act239 provides as follows: 
Any person born in the Republic and who is not a South Africa citizen by virtue of the 
provisions of subsection (1)240, shall be a South African citizen by birth, if – 
(a) he or she does not have the citizenship or nationality of any other country, or has no 
right to such citizenship or nationality; and 
(b) his or her birth is registered in the Republic in accordance with the Births and Deaths 
Registration Act 51 of 1992. 
The author submits that section 2(2) is the only saving grace for stateless children born 
in South Africa. South Africa is one of few African countries that have this unique 
provision to prevent statelessness and to protect the right to a nationality. It is 
furthermore remarkable that South Africa grants this right from birth – there are no 
requirements such as a specific length of residence.241 The only administrative 
requirement is that the birth is registered. 
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Amendment Act of 2010 (2010 Citizenship Amendment Act). 
239
 South African Citizenship Act 88 of 1995. 
240
 Section 2(1) of the Citizenship Act provides: any person (a) who immediately prior to the date of 
commencement of the South African Citizenship Amendment Act, 2010, was a South African citizen by 
birth; or (b) who is born in or outside the Republic, one of his or her parents, at the time of his or her birth, 
being a South African citizen, shall be a South African citizen by birth. 
241
 George J and Elphick R (2014:84). 
 
 
 
 
44 
 
Unfortunately, children born to parents who are stateless, undocumented or irregular 
migrants are least likely to be able to register their children’s birth due to lack of 
identification and fear of arrest. The combination of birth registration being required for 
children242 and birth registration being impossible for parents without the requisite 
documentation or legal status means that both the registration of children and the 
safeguard against statelessness are contingent on the status of the parents.243 This, in 
return violates the child’s fundamental constitutional right to a name244 and nationality 
from birth. LHR and the Institute for Statelessness provides that aforementioned 
restriction undermines the protection against statelessness found in Section 2(2) of the 
Citizenship Act,245 perpetuates the cycle of lack of documentation and legal status 
(including nationality) and undermines the right to an identity of all children.246 
There are no regulations in place to guide and monitor the implementation of Section 
2(2) of the Citizenship Act which provides for the acquisition of South African nationality 
of children born in the territory who would otherwise be stateless.247 In DGLR and 
KMRG v The Minister of Home Affairs, The Director General of Home Affairs,248 The 
High Court granted an order in which the applicant (who was born stateless in South 
Africa) was declared a South African citizen by birth and the Department of Home Affairs 
was ordered to make and implement a regulation to facilitate applications for nationality 
under Section 2(2) of the Act.249 The Department has to-date failed to implement this 
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 …to benefit from the safeguard against statelessness. 
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 Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR) and the Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion (the Institute) (2015) 
“Civil Society Submission on the right of every child to acquire a nationality under Article 7 CRC”  73rd 
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_rIqeTO0sgmMw 29. 
244
 The right to a name starts with birth and includes the right to be registered by the state in a birth 
register immediately after birth.  Inclusion in the population register provides access to social grants, 
education and health and social services and facilitates the child’s subsequent participation in the civil and 
political community by enabling her to apply for an ID and to vote.   
245
 Section 2(2) of the Citizenship Act refers to people who are born on the territory without access to any 
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order.250 Instead, the Department appealed to the SCA but withdrew the appeal on the 
day of the hearing on Monday 5 September 2016.251 
The Citizenship Act was amended by the South African Citizenship Amendment Act 17 
of 2010.252 Under the amended Act, the importance placed on birthplace is removed; 
section 2(1) (b) now provides that: ... any person born in or outside the Republic, one of 
his or her parents, at the time of his or her birth, being a South African citizen, shall be a 
South African citizen by birth. 
The recently amended Act provides at section 4(3) that a child born in the Republic of 
parents who are not South African citizens or who have not been admitted into the 
Republic for permanent residence, qualifies to apply for South African citizenship upon 
becoming a major if – (a) he or she has lived in the Republic from the date of his or her 
birth to the date of becoming a major; and (b) his or her birth has been registered in 
accordance with the provisions of the BDRA253. At present, there are no regulations in 
place to guide and monitor the implementation of Section 4(3).254 Furthermore, the 
BDRA prevents the registration of the births of children of undocumented or irregular 
migrants, undermining Section 4(3), particularly in the absence of implementing 
regulations.255 The present situation can (and does) therefore lead to children being 
rendered stateless upon attainment of majority, with no access to any nationality.256   
3.2.3. Births and Deaths Registration Act 51 of 1992 
Birth registration is the key to nationality in South Africa. For all those who qualify for 
citizenship or permanent residence, it is the critical moment when a person is entered 
into the National Population Register.  In order to obtain an ID in South Africa, one must 
first apply for a birth certificate and be issued with an ID number. Only at this point can a 
South African citizen apply for an ID and passport and conduct other civil registry 
activities, such as registering one’s children’s births, registering marriages and 
registering deaths.257 
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The Department of Home Affairs (“DHA”) recently took a decision to cease issuance of 
abridged birth certificates; for all births after 4 March 2013, only unabridged birth 
certificates will be issued.258 The BDRA259 provides for birth registration of all children 
born on the territory, whether to South Africans or foreign parents. Children born in 
South Africa who do not qualify for citizenship are entitled to a birth certificate under the 
BDRA.260 However, they are issued birth certificates that do not include an ID number 
and the child is not entered into the National Population Register.261  
3.2.3.1 Who may register a child’s birth? 
Where the child’s parents are married, the birth may be registered by either parent 
under the surname of the mother or father or under both of their surnames joined 
together.262 Where the parents are not married, the mother must register the child.263 
She can do so under her own surname and without including the father’s particulars,264 
or with the father’s particulars if the father consents and acknowledges he is the father in 
writing on the birth notice form.265 
The child can be registered under the father’s surname if the mother and father are both 
present at the office of the Department of Home Affairs at the times of application for 
registration, if the mother consents in writing (on birth notice form), and if the father 
acknowledges he is the father and consents in writing (on the birth notice form) to the 
child being registered under his name.266 This law applies to same-sex couples as well, 
both parties must be present and provide consent to what surname the child will be 
registered under. 
Persons born abroad to South African nationals are entitled to South African citizenship 
by birth under section 2(1) (b) of the Citizenship Act.267 A child of a South African citizen 
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may apply for birth registration with the South African authorities within South Africa or in 
the country of their birth.268 
Section 13 of the BDRA states: If a child of a father or a mother who is a South African 
citizen is born outside the Republic, notice of birth may be given to the head of a South 
African diplomatic or consular mission, or a regional representative in the Republic. 
Regulation 11 states that: A notice of birth given for a child born of South African citizens 
outside the Republic as contemplated in section 13 of the Act shall be … accompanied 
by … an unabridged birth certificate or other similar document issued by the relevant 
authority in the country where the birth occurred. 
However, some children who are born abroad are turned away from local Department of 
Home Affairs’ offices on the advice that they may only register their birth at the South 
African consulate in their country of birth.269 This becomes problematic in instances 
where there is no consular presence in that territory or where the child is unable to 
return to the birth country.270 Some of these children are told to return to the country of 
their birth and apply for a passport from that country in order to register their births in 
South Africa.271  
There is no provision which requires this. It is also practice at the local offices to ask the 
applicant to obtain confirmation of the authenticity if the birth certificate from the country 
of birth.272  
Given that a birth certificate ‘issued by the relevant authority in the country in which the 
birth occurred’ is a prerequisite to birth registration for children born abroad to citizens, 
access to citizenship for those born abroad is dependent on the functionality and ease of 
access to the birth registration system in the country of birth.273 
The author submits that the abovementioned section 2(1)(b), section 13 and regulation 
11 could be helpful in an international surrogacy case which involves South Africans 
seeking surrogacy abroad. However, they might come across difficulties if the country in 
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which the child was born in recognises the surrogate mother as the legal mother 
(whether full or partial surrogacy). The surrogate mother’s name as the child’s legal 
parent will be on the birth certificate and not the commissioning mother. The 
commissioning parents will not be recognised as the child’s legal parents. This has 
implications for the child’s ability to become a citizen of a particular country and the 
child’s ability to obtain documentation to enable him or her to gain entry to the 
commissioning parents’ country of origin.274 As a result, the commissioning parents 
would have to go through an adoption procedure. In this event, international adoption 
requirements must be met.  
The fact that citizenship is the basis for all other fundamental rights means that the 
BDRA should be read with flexibility to allow citizens born abroad to access citizenship 
even if they are unable to obtain a foreign birth certificate.275 This flexibility or discretion 
has been eliminated entirely by the 2010 amendments to the BDRA and regulations, in 
terms of which certain prescribed requirements276 must be met failing which the 
application will be rejected.277 
In the end, legal parentage determines who may register a child’s birth and citizenship of 
a child. Consequently, if South Africans obtain a child via surrogacy in a foreign country, 
they are bound to encounter instances where, if the foreign country were to confer legal 
parentage on one or both of the commissioning parents, their parentage might not be 
recognised in South Africa.278 and therefore the commissioning parents will be unable to 
register to child’s birth and apply for the child’s citizenship. The commissioning parents 
will have to seek alternative solutions such an international adoption.279  
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3.3  Applying for a Passport 
If the commissioning parents want to remove the child from South Africa to their country 
of origin to obtain an adoption there, they will probably encounter their first hurdle when 
they attempt to obtain a passport for the child from the South African authorities.280 The 
application for the passport must be accompanied by the child’s birth certificate281 and 
the personal particulars of the parents or legal guardian of the child who applied for the 
passport must be verified from the South African population register.282 In the event that 
a child born of invalid surrogacy has no legal relationship with the commissioning 
parents, their names would not appear on the birth certificate. The certificate would 
identify the surrogate mother as the child’s mother. If the surrogate mother is a party to a 
marriage or civil union, her husband or civil union partner would be registered as the 
child’s father.283 The information set out on the birth certificate would alert the authorities 
to the fact that persons who are not the legal parents or guardians of the child are 
applying for a passport for a child. This would, in all probability, result in an investigation 
into the circumstances surrounding the child’s birth, which would alert the authorities to 
the invalid surrogacy. 
3.4 Domicile in South Africa 
Domicile is the place where a person is legally deemed to be constantly present for the 
purpose of exercising her or his rights and fulfilling his or her obligations, even in the 
event of her or his factual absence.284 
Although one of the elements of domicile is that normally it is also the permanent 
residence of the person concerned, residence in the ordinary sense of the word as the 
place where one eats and sleeps is not necessarily the same as domicile in the legal 
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sense.285 To acquire a domicile in the legal sense the person must have the intention of 
settling at the particular place for an indefinite period.286 
A person’s lex domicilii plays a significant role in many fields of private law. A person’s 
private law status is determined by the law of the place where he or she is domiciled.287  
3.4.1 General principles governing domicile 
Every person must have a domicile at all times.288 In other words, no one can ever be 
without a domicile. A change of domicile is never merely accepted. It must always be 
proved. Whether a person has acquired or lost a domicile is determined on a balance of 
probabilities.289 The author will now discuss the different types of domicile. 
3.4.2 Domicile of origin 
A person’s domicile of origin is the domicile the law confers on the person at birth.290 
The Domicile Act provides that no one loses his or her domicile until he or she has 
acquired another domicile, whether by choice or operation of law.291 The Act further 
specifically provides that a person’s domicile of origin does not revive,292 although a 
person can have a domicile where his or her domicile of origin was if he or she acquires 
a domicile of choice there293 or if he or she does not have the capacity to acquire a 
domicile of choice and the law assigns a domicile to him or her294 at the place where his 
or her domicile of origin was because he or she is most closely connected with that 
place.295 
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3.4.3 Domicile of choice 
A domicile of choice is the domicile a person who has capacity to act has chosen for 
himself or herself by exercise of his or her free will.296  
Section 1(1) of the Domicile Act provides that, regardless of sex or marital status, 
everyone who is of or over the age of 18 years and everyone under the age of 18 years 
who legally has the status of a major, is competent to acquire a domicile of choice, 
unless he or she lacks the mental capacity to make a rational choice. Section 1(1) 
indicates that the first requirement for acquiring a domicile of choice is that the person 
who wants to acquire such a domicile must be a major or have the status of a major.297   
Section 1(2) of the Act sets further requirements for the acquisition of a domicile of 
choice. It provides that a domicile of choice is acquired by a person when he is lawfully 
present at a particular place and has the intention to settle there for an indefinite 
period.298 The section thus requires, firstly, that the person must actually settle at the 
particular place where he or she wants to acquire a domicile of choice and, secondly, 
that his or her presence there must be lawful.  
3.4.4 Domicile by operation of law 
Section 2(1) of the Domicile Act provides that anyone who does not have the capacity to 
acquire a domicile of choice is domiciled at the place with which he or she is most 
closely connected. Minors cannot acquire a domicile of choice. To them the law assigns 
a domicile by operation of law for as long as their minority continues, and that domicile is 
the place with which the particular person is mostly closely connected. Section 2(2) 
contains the rebuttable presumption that if a minor normally has his or her home with 
one or both of his or her parents, the parental home is the minor’s domicile. The Act 
expressly provides that the term parents include a child’s adoptive parents and parents 
who are not married to each other. 
3.5 The Criminal Aspect of International Surrogacy Agreements 
As mentioned in Chapter two, section 305 of the Children’s Act provides that a person 
who contravenes the provisions of s 301, 302 and 303, is guilty of an offence and liable 
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to a fine or imprisonment for a period not exceeding 10 years, or both a fine and 
imprisonment. In the general law of contract, any act carried out in contravention of a 
statutory provision will have the effect of being null and void.299 
Section 297(2) of the Children’s Act deals with the consequences of an invalid surrogacy 
agreement. It provides that any surrogacy agreement that does not comply with the 
provision of the Children’s Act is invalid and any child born as a result of any action 
taken in execution of such arrangement is for all purposes deemed to be the child of the 
woman that gave birth to that child. This section does not however, criminalise invalid 
surrogacy agreements. 
In the case of Ex Parte: Ms & Others,300 Acting Judge Keightley submitted that the 
Children’s Act does not provide what the consequences of non-compliance with the 
provisions will be on the validity of a written agreement subsequently entered into 
between the parties.301 She provides that the Act is also silent on whether the court has 
the power to validate such an agreement under section 292.302 She further submits that 
the common law principle that an agreement to commit an unlawful act is not 
enforceable.303 However, she provides that the principle is not determinative of the 
issues that arise from the case.304 Thereafter, by considering the child’s best interests 
and various other fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution, she found that the 
Children’s Act does not preclude a court305 from confirming a surrogacy agreement 
subsequent to the artificial fertilisation of a surrogate mother in exceptional 
circumstances, and when the best interest of the child demand confirmation.306 
Therefore, the agreement with the subsequent confirmation by the High Court will be 
valid and enforceable. 
As the law stands, an international surrogacy agreement concluded in South Africa by 
foreign nationals or South Africans entering into an agreement in another country is 
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entered into in contravention of the Children’s Act. Furthermore, any conduct which 
flows out of such agreement which amounts to a contravention, would result in the 
agreement being invalid, but not a crime/ 
This consequence is often not taken into consideration, when the commissioning 
parents and the surrogate mother conclude the surrogacy agreement. Thus, when the 
commissioning parents gain a child through surrogacy, they often find that the road 
home is fraught with difficulties,307 as shown in the international case law discussed 
below.  
As discussed above in paragraph 3.3, the application for the passport must be 
accompanied by the child’s birth certificate and the personal particulars of the parents 
who applied for the passport must be verified from the South African population register. 
This cannot be done if South Africa does not recognise the commissioning parents as 
the child’s legal parents. Therefore, the child will not be able to enter South Africa with a 
South African passport. This may lead to commissioning parents forging birth certificates 
and fraudulently registering themselves as the legal parents of a child born from an 
international surrogacy agreement. In addition to the above, commissioning parents 
have resorted to smuggling a child into countries.308  
Later in this thesis, the author will show that South Africans’ are relocating and having 
their legal parentage disputed. Therefore, it can be submitted that if a South African 
court is faced with an international surrogacy agreement that child is already born. The 
child is arguably seen as the commissioning parent(s) legal child in the other country. 
Therefore, if the child is sent back to the other country, the child will be parentless and 
even stateless. If we apply the current legal position regarding international surrogacy, 
the child will be parentless and stateless in South Africa as well.  
Therefore, the author submits again that it is important for the South Africa authorities to 
consider the possibility of international surrogacy agreement. There are many factors 
that that come into play regarding international surrogacy agreement. Factors such as: 
strict laws and the reasons behind those strict laws; public policy; the best interests of 
the child; rights of the commissioning parents and surrogate mother rights as well as the 
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criminal aspect of international surrogacy as a consequence of an international 
surrogacy agreement. 
3.6 Conclusion 
Section 28 of the Constitution provides that every child has the right to a name and a 
nationality from birth and a right to family care or parental care. Section 28 further 
provides that a child’s best interests are of paramount importance in every matter 
concerning the child. An international surrogate motherhood agreement falls within the 
scope of ‘every matter concerning the child’. Thus, the author submits that the court, if 
faced with an international surrogate motherhood agreement, must take into account the 
child’s best interests by weighing the circumstances of the surrogate mother and the 
commissioning parents before declaring the international surrogate motherhood 
agreement invalid and enforceable. The court might find that by denying recognition of 
legal parentage to the commissioning parents might unjustifiably violate the child’s right 
to parental care. 
Thereafter, the author explored the South African legislation that may be applicable to 
the children born of commissioning parents (whether the commissioning parents are 
South Africans or foreign nationals) who entered into international surrogacy 
agreements. The author enumerated the requirements of birth registration in South 
Africa to show the birth registration process in South Africa and if the Act might be 
applicable to international surrogacy agreements.  
The author concluded that the South African Citizenship Act 88 of 1995 has provided 
children born to South African or foreign nationals living in South Africa some sort of 
protection against statelessness. Section 2(2) of the Citizenship Act provides that any 
person born on the territory who is statelessness is entitles to South African citizenship 
by birth, provided the birth is registered in accordance with South African law. As the law 
stands, a child born from an international surrogacy agreement will be the child of the 
surrogate mother because the agreement would not be confirmed by the High Court and 
thus the agreement would not be enforceable. The author expostulates against the 
current position of South African law because of the possibility of the surrogate mother 
not wanting the child. In a situation where the surrogate mother cannot afford to take 
care of the child, the commissioning parents (whether South Africans or foreign 
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nationals) are willing to provide the child with the parental care that the child needs. In 
both instances denying the recognition of legal parentage of the commissioning parents 
in respect of the child, unjustifiably violates his or her constitutional rights.  
The South African Citizenship Act provides that children born abroad to South Africans 
nationals are entitled to South African citizenship by birth. Section 13 of the Births and 
Deaths Registration Act states that if a child born of a South African father or mother is 
born outside the Republic of South Africa, notice of the child’s birth may be given to the 
head of a South African consular mission. This notice must be accompanied by an 
unabridged certificate. Furthermore, section 2(1) (b) of the Citizenship Act provides that 
persons born outside the Republic of South Africa to a South African parent are citizens 
by birth. The author submitted that these two sections might be helpful in cases of 
international surrogacy. However, it depends on whether the country in which the 
surrogate-born child recognises the surrogate mother or the commissioning mother as 
the child’s legal mother/parent. 
Thereafter, the author looked at the criminal aspect of international surrogacy 
agreements. Section 305 of the Children’s Act provides that a person who contravenes 
the provisions of s 301, 302 and 303,is guilty of an offence and liable to a fine or 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding 10 years, or both a fine and imprisonment. The 
author submitted that the court may need to determine whether the international 
surrogacy agreement is null and void and whether the parties to the agreement are 
liable to a fine or imprisonment. 
The next chapter will examine potential situations that South African courts may be 
seized with by observing international case law.  
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CHAPTER 4: CONSEQUENCES OF INTERNATIONAL SURROGACY AGREEMENTS 
“…lack of a properly supported and regulated framework for arrangements, 
of this kind has inevitably, lead to an increase in these cases before the 
Family Court.”309 
4.1 Introduction 
Throughout the author’s research, the author found that South African courts did not 
have precedents, guidelines or legislation governing international surrogacy. One of the 
main consequences of international surrogacy relates to the possibility of a surrogate 
born child suffering from not being legally recognized as the legal child of his or her 
commissioning parents. As a result, the child can be left with no parents and no 
nationality. The unfortunate result of non-recognition of the parent-child relationship 
causes a number of serious consequences for the rights and welfare of the child. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, the Constitution provides that ‘every child has the right to a 
name and nationality from birth’.310  
This chapter will examine potential situations that South African courts may be seized 
with by observing international case law. Lastly, the author will provide 
recommendations regarding what approach South African courts should take regarding 
international surrogacy agreements.  
4.2 Potential Situations that a South African Court might be seized with 
The author will now explore several cases in this field that will demonstrate that the 
problems of the parentless and stateless child are inherent in international surrogacy 
agreements. The author therefore compiled several ‘what if’ situations that could surface 
based on examples drawn from international case law. 
4.2.1 Scenario 1 
A South African court may be presented with a situation where foreign nationals residing 
in South Africa have the desire to have a surrogate mother with the same nationality as 
themselves. However, this potential surrogate mother is not domiciled in South Africa. 
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The court may be seized with the challenge of determining whether this situation falls 
within the ‘good cause shown’ clause and determine whether the agreement would be 
valid in terms of section 295 of the Children’s Act. 
In 2014 and in the United Kingdom (hereafter “UK”), a parental order application was 
made by a married gay couple who became commissioning parents of child conceived 
through surrogacy in the UK.311 One father was a South African and the other was 
British. The surrogate mother was the British father’s sister.312 The commissioning 
parents lived in South Africa. The case report confirms that the fathers’ application was 
issued soon after the child’s birth in August 2013 in UK. Thereafter, the couple took the 
child to South Africa and returned to the UK for the final hearing. The case is silent on 
where the commissioning fathers decided to stay after the final hearing. The case is also 
silent on whether the fathers are recognized as the child’s legal parents in South Africa 
or how the parents were able to bring the child into South Africa. 
The main issue for the UK court to resolve was whether the British father remained 
domiciled in the UK,  even though he had lived in South Africa since 2007.313 In this 
case, the court held that if a person leaves their domicile of origin to reside in another 
country with the intention of living there for some indefinite period, he will not necessarily 
lose his domicile of origin if he intends to return, at some point, to the country that the 
left. The Court found that the British father had retained his domicile in the UK.  
Furthermore, the fathers met all of the other requirements under the UK law314 and were 
therefore granted a British parental order in February 2014.315 
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The facts of the abovementioned case may be used as an example of what ‘good cause 
shown’ as stipulated in section 292(2) of the Children’s Act and discussed in Chapter 2, 
could possibly mean. Louw,316 submitted that ‘good cause shown’ could mean that the 
commissioning parents may use a relative as a surrogate mother. In this case, the 
commissioning parents were residing in South Africa. One of the commissioning fathers 
was domiciled in South Africa, the other domiciled in the UK. They chose to use the 
British father’s sister as a surrogate mother. As the author mentioned above, the case is 
silent on why they chose the use the surrogate mother, whose gametes were used and 
where the commissioning parents decided to reside after the court granted the parental 
order. As surrogacy laws in South African stands, it is unclear as to whether this 
surrogacy agreement will be considered as valid and enforceable in South Africa. 
4.2.2 Scenario 2 
There may be situation where a South African court has confirmed a surrogacy 
agreement involving foreign nationals or South Africans. Unfortunately when these 
foreign nationals return back to their place of birth or when South Africans intend to 
relocate to their partner’s place of birth, the parental order in South Africa may not be 
recognised in the other country. This could also be an issue for South Africans living 
abroad who have a child born from a surrogacy agreement in another country. The issue 
that arises is whether the commissioning parents would be recognised as the legal 
parents of the child even though the agreement was confirmed in South Africa or the 
other country. The following international case is an example of a situation where a 
surrogacy agreement was declared valid in South Africa however, it still required a court 
application to confer parental status in the UK. 
In Re A (Foreign Surrogacy: South Africa) [2015] EWHC 1756,317 an application for a 
parental order in relation to a minor child, cited as “A” was brought. One of the 
commissioning parents is domiciled in the UK. The surrogate mother is domiciled in 
South Africa.318 “A” was born in South Africa following a surrogacy agreement.  She was 
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conceived following IVF treatment with an embryo created from sperm from the 
commissioning father and an egg from a third party donor.319   
This was the second application for a parental order brought by the commissioning 
parents.  They made a previous application in relation to their surrogate born child, 
“B”.320  He was born in April 2011, again in South Africa, but with a different surrogate 
mother.321   
The Court considered whether the application met the requirements under the UK 
law.322 For this dissertation, it is important to note that the UK Court was addressed on 
the South African surrogacy procedure by a Mr Duffett and he described in his report the 
procedures that took place in South Africa.323 On 29th October 2013, the Cape Town 
High Court had confirmed the surrogate motherhood agreement entered into between 
the parties with a direction that the child born of the surrogate mother, in accordance 
with the agreement, is for all purposes the child of the commissioning parents from the 
moment of birth.324  It was further ordered that both of the commissioning parents have 
full parental rights and responsibilities of the child, and that the surrogate mother has no 
rights of parenthood or care and that the child would have no claim for maintenance 
against her.325  Further, the order made provision that no adoption procedures would 
need to be followed as the child would be registered as the child of both commissioning 
parents.326 Thereafter, the couple with the child decided to relocate to the UK.   
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The author submits that the Judge in the UK Court held that the commissioning father 
retained his domiciled status in the UK. However, the domicile status of the other 
commissioning father was not considered but it was assumed by the Court that he was 
domiciled in South Africa. The author further submits that section 292(1)(c) of the 
Children’s Act,327 which provides that at least one of the commissioning parents must be 
domiciled in South Africa may have created a loophole for international surrogacy in 
South Africa. It raises the risk of limping relationships that arises when surrogacy 
agreement is valid in South Africa where it was concluded but is invalid elsewhere. One 
of the differences in the aforementioned case and the case discussed under scenario 
one (1) is the uncertainty of whether subsequent to the granting of the parental order, 
the commissioning parents reside in the UK or South Africa.  Regarding the case 
discussion below, if the commissioning parents went back to South Africa, there’s further 
uncertainty regarding whether the surrogacy agreement was brought before the High 
Court for consideration. In addition, it is unclear whether the commissioning fathers are 
recognised as the surrogate born child’s legal parents in South Africa and whether the 
child fundamental rights are protected in South Africa.  
The Family Court of Australian court dealt with the recognition of legal parentage in the 
case of Carlton & Bissett and Anor [2013] FamCa 143.328 The court had to determine 
whether the second applicant (Mr Bissett) was a legal parent under the terms of the 
Family Law Act 1975 of children born pursuant to an international surrogacy agreement. 
The application was brought by Mr Carlton on behalf of Mr Bissett; the application 
concerned two children born through an altruistic surrogacy arrangement entered into 
between Mr Bissett and the surrogate Ms Schmitt (hereafter referred to “the surrogate 
mother) in 2009 in South Africa.329 Mr Bissett and the surrogate mother were both 
domiciled in South Africa. The applicant was domiciled Australia.330 The children were 
born in South Africa in October 2010 and have lived with Mr Bissett in South Africa since 
then.331   
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After the children were born, Mr Bissett met Mr Carlton and in 2012, Mr Bissett and the 
children relocated to Australia and lived with the Mr Carlton.332  Mr Carlton then applied 
to the Family Court of Australia in Sydney for an order declaring that Mr Bissett was the 
parent of the child.  The significant issue before the court was whether Mr Bissett was a 
parent.333  Judge Ryan found that Mr Bissett was a parent within the meaning of the 
Family Law Act 1975334 and that it was in the children’s best interest to continue to live 
with the applicant and Mr Bissett.335 
 
Judge Ryan of the Australian Court noted that, in order to determine legal parentage of 
children born of surrogacy agreement, the application of the law of the country where 
the children were born in, must be considered and applied if such law is not considered 
to be against public policy.336 The Judge was satisfied that Mr Bissett was recognized by 
South African law as the children’s father. The court further held that, Mr Bissett with Mr 
Carlton would take on a parental role in the children’s lives. 
 
It appears from the above three international cases that South Africans are involved in 
court applications regarding international surrogacy agreements, in which their legal 
parentage is being questioned. It appears that ordinary rules of private international law 
will apply in a situation where commissioning parents who had a child by a valid 
surrogacy agreement in South Africa, settled in another country.  It appears that the 
commissioning parents will be the legal parents of the child when South African law is 
applicable law, unless it is against the other country’s public policy. However, there is 
yet to be a dispute of this nature in South African courts. If South African courts decide 
not to apply ordinary rules of private international law, the court should consider the best 
interests of the child principle. This principle was considered in the international cases 
discussed below. 
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In Re: X & Y (Foreign Surrogacy) [2008] EWHC 3030 (Fam),337 A British couple entered 
into an international surrogacy agreement with a Ukrainian surrogate mother who gave 
birth to twins.338 The British court was concerned that the child was at risk of being 
“marooned stateless and parentless whilst the applicants could neither remain in the 
Ukraine nor bring the children to the home.”339 Ultimately, the court relied on the best 
interests of the child standard to recognize the child as a legitimate child of the 
commissioning parents, and therefore a citizen of the United Kingdom.340  
The Mennesson v France341  and Labassee v France342  cases both concerned children 
born to surrogate mothers in the United States of America, for French commissioning 
parents. The matters stemmed from France’s refusal to register the children’s birth 
despite American court orders recognising the commissioning parents as the children’s 
legal parents.343  This rendered the children’s legal status highly uncertain. The refusal 
to register their births in France triggered day-to-day difficulties for the children, ranging 
from a lack of nationality, to their ability to access social security and education.344  
The Mennesson345 and Labassee346  couples applied on behalf of their children to the 
European Court, alleging violations of their rights to respect for family and private life.347  
While acknowledging that the lack of French citizenship posed challenges for the family, 
the court did not find these challenges insurmountable: the family was still able to live 
together as a unit, and enjoy family life.348  Additionally, the court stressed that a “wide 
margin of appreciation” had to be left to the countries in creating surrogacy laws, in view 
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of the difficult ethical issues involved and the lack of consensus on these matters in 
Europe.349  
However, with respect to the children’s right to respect for private life, the court found 
that “respect for private life requires that everyone should be able to work out the details 
of their identity as a human being, which includes the legal parent-child relationship”, 
and that an essential aspect of the identity of individuals is at stake where the legal 
parent-child relationship is concerned.” 350 
The European Court recognised that it is conceivable that “France may wish to deter its 
nationals from going abroad to take advantage of methods of assisted reproduction that 
are prohibited on its own territory.”351  However, the European Court ultimately granted 
greater weight to the interests of the child.352 
In Paradiso and Campanelli v Italy353, the commissioning parents were Italian nationals 
who entered into a surrogacy agreement with a woman in Russia though a Russian 
surrogacy agency.354 The child was conceived through an IVF procedure. The 
commissioning parents travelled back to Italy with the intention of registering the child’s 
birth there.355 The Italian authorities refused the registration and initiated criminal 
proceedings against the commissioning parents for fraud.356 Pursuant to this, the Italian 
authorities place the child in a children’s home for adoption.357  
The European Court considered in particular that the public policy considerations 
underlying the Italian authority’s finding that the commissioning parents had attempted 
to circumvent laws in Italy could not take precedence over the best interests of the child. 
This was regardless of the absence of any biological relationship and the short period 
during which the commissioning parents had cared for him.358 Reiterating that the 
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removal of a child from the family setting was an extreme measure that could be justified 
only in the event of immediate danger to that child, the European Court concluded that, 
in the present case, the conditions justifying a removal had not been met.359 
All things considered, it appears that some courts will apply the ordinary rules of private 
international law or the courts will take a child-centred approach. With regards to rules of 
private international law, the courts will determine whether legal parentage exists 
between the commissioning parents and the child by applying the laws of the country 
where the child was born. A child-centred approach will consider child-based rights such 
as the right to a nationality and right to a family by taking measures to ensure that the 
surrogate born child does not run the risk of becoming stateless and parentless. 
4.2.3 Scenario 3 
A single parent, whether South African or a foreign national enters into an international 
surrogacy in South Africa or in another country. A single parent is prohibited from 
entering into a domestic surrogacy agreement in South Africa, if he or she would not be 
genetically linked to the child. This was one of the issues challenged in the AB v Minister 
of Social Development case,360 discussed in chapter 2 above. One of the arguments 
addressed to the court was that the requirement of the genetic link discriminates against 
single parents because the implication of section 294 of the Children’s Act is that in 
instances where  a  single  commissioning  parent  or both commissioning parents are 
infertile they are excluded from pursuing surrogacy as an option. The author will now 
restate what was previous mentioned in Chapter 2 for the purposes of this scenario. 
In the case of AB v Minister of Social Development, the applicants challenged the 
constitutional validity of the provisions of section 294 of the Children’s Act on the 
grounds that the genetic link requirement violates various fundamental rights. The 
genetic link requirement made it impossible for the first applicant to conclude a 
surrogate agreement and consequently made it impossible for her to become a parent. It 
was argued by the applicants that the concept of surrogacy means to create an 
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opportunity to persons who cannot give birth themselves to become parents irrespective 
of whether the child will be genetically related to the parent or not. 
The case centred on the best interests of the child. The Surrogacy Advisory Group as 
amicus curiae, relied on the expert opinions of leading international and local 
psychologists. These experts all stated that a parent–child genetic link is not essential 
for a child’s well-being. Judge Basson accepted this expert evidence and concluded as 
follows: 
‘A family cannot be defined with reference to the question whether a genetic link 
between the parent and the child exists. More importantly, our society does not regard a 
family consisting of an adopted child or adopted children as less valuable or less equal 
than a family where children are the natural or genetically linked children of the parents. 
A family can therefore not be defined by genetic lineage. The legislature should 
therefore, in my view, take due cognisance of the advances made in fertility and 
reproductive technology and with that comes the obligation to redefine the traditional 
view of the family.’361 
The following case is not an exact example of the aforementioned example, but it 
reflects the unfortunate result of non-recognition of the parent-child relationship even in 
cases where a genetic link exits between the commissioning parent and the child. In the 
case of Baby Manji,362 a Japanese couple used a gestational surrogate mother with a 
donor egg in India, but divorced before the baby was born.363 The commissioning 
mother did not want the surrogate born child but the commissioning father did.364 
However, at the time, Japanese law did not recognize surrogacy and Indian law would 
not allow a single man to adopt a baby.365 In order to be recognized as the legal parent, 
the father had to conduct an uphill legal battle both in Japan, which did not recognize the 
legality and enforceability of the surrogacy agreement, and in India, due to India’s strict 
prohibition on a single intending father adopting a female baby, especially when the 
parent is not Hindu.366 As a result, the baby was stuck in India for almost six months 
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waiting for her Japanese passport following her recognition as the legal daughter of the 
Japanese father. 
The author submits that non-recognition of a parent-child relationship leads to various 
disadvantages for children. They might not be registered because they legally do not 
have parents (in the event that the surrogate mother does not want the child). While we 
cannot deny the importance of our genes, it is dangerous and often inaccurate to view a 
person’s genetic link as the supreme determinant of parenthood.367 Elevating the gene 
over any other contributing factor ignores the roles our environment and relationships 
play in shaping our being. Society may recognize and value the genetic link between a 
parent and child without making it the decisive factor in determining parenthood.368 The 
genetic bond between a parent and child is given special legal treatment not simply 
because of the genetic link, but because of the unique responsibilities associated with 
the bond. 
In conclusion and in light of the above analysis, a strong trend emerges - that of a 
contradiction between the written law and actual practices. Countries have failed to 
address the fact that these arrangements happen internationally and inconsistent 
regulations and cases are the result.369 At the center of these disputes is the need to 
protect the rights of the child. It has been shown that no matter the domestic regime in 
place regarding surrogacy, whether permitted or not, states are continually faced with 
these types of agreements. 
The author submits that given the continuing growth of international surrogacy and the 
wide range of human rights challenges it presents, it is important for South African 
authorities and courts to consider the possibility of international surrogacy occurring in 
South Africa or being pursued by South Africans abroad. Hopefully, the South African 
courts take a child-centered approach, building on the views established in the above 
discussed international case law and it is proposed that they do not adopt a strict 
interpretation of our current laws. As it was stated in S v M370 a 'truly child-centred 
approach requires an in depth consideration of the needs and rights of the particular 
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child in the 'precise real-life situation he or she is in.’371 The 'precise real-life situation' of 
a child born of a surrogacy agreement is that he/she is brought into the world as a result 
of a real desire of their commissioning parents to have him/her.372 
 The author suggests that the South African Parliament either re-drafts or provides 
clearer guidelines regarding surrogacy and the possibility of international surrogacy 
agreements. 
4.3 The Possible Way Forward 
With the above discussion in mind, the author will now provide recommendations to the 
South African courts by making reference to the current law in place.  
4.3.1. Inclusion of adequate provisions and inspection by authorities 
 
Section 295(1)(d) of the Children’s Act373 provides that a court may not confirm a 
surrogate agreement unless (amongst other requirements) the agreement includes 
adequate provisions for the contact, care, upbringing and general welfare of the child 
that is to be born in a stable home environment, including the child’s position in the 
event of the death of the commissioning parents or one of them, or their divorce or 
separation before the birth of the child. The aim of the provision is to ensure that the 
parties consider the care of the child. Although para (d) obliges the parties to reach 
consensus on the care of the child, the word ‘including’ would seem to mean that the 
examples provided for in the provision should not be considered a numerus clausus.374  
 
Section 295(1)(e) of the Act provides that, ‘in general, having regard to the personal 
circumstances and family situations of all the parties concerned, but above all the 
interests of the child that is to be born, the agreement should be confirmed.’ The 
aforementioned section is evidently an all-encompassing provision obliging the court to 
consider whether, in the light of all circumstances of the parties concerned, the 
confirmation of the agreement would probably be in the best interests of the child.375 It 
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reiterates and confirms the paramountcy of the child’s best interest as entrenched in 
section 28(2) of the Constitution.376  
 
The author submits that if the aforementioned provisions can be applied to international 
surrogacy agreements, it may be a start to a regulated international surrogacy 
framework in South Africa. Furthermore, it would be possible to dictate, upon birth, the 
child’s nationality and the required visa to be transferred to the commissioning parent(s). 
In Carlton & Bissett and Anor [2013] FamCa 143 (discussed above), the commissioning 
parents, gave oral evidence regarding the strength of their relationship and the high 
quality of care afforded to the children.377 The effect of their evidence was that the 
applicants, Mr Bissett and Mr Carlton were committed to each other as partners and to 
the children as parent and in loco parentis (respectively). They had set up a ‘child 
focused family’ in which the children’s interests and needs had a priority.378 The 
substance of their evidence was that whatever they needed to do in order to provide for 
the children would be done.379 
 
The author submits that the courts should always consider the best interests of the child 
born from an international surrogacy agreement. The courts may exercise their 
discretion by hearing evidence regarding the strength of the commissioning parent’s 
relationship to each other and to the child(ren) and how they plan on raising the 
child(ren). By doing this, a court may decide whether it is in the best interests of the child 
to live with the commissioning parent(s) before declaring the agreement invalid. 
 
4.3.2. Suitability of commissioning parents 
 
Before ordering the international surrogacy agreement null and void, the courts should 
first look at the suitability of the commissioning parents. In practice, such suitability is 
determined by a screening process conducted by psychologists and social workers, 
usually at the expense of the commissioning parents.380 Section 295(1)(b) of the Act381 
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stipulates that the commissioning parents must be competent to enter into the 
agreement; they must be suitable persons to accept the responsibility of parenting of the 
child born of the agreement. Additionally, the commissioning parents must be able to 
understand and accept the rights, obligations and legal consequences which flow from 
the surrogacy agreement.  
 
The author agrees with the above mentioned requirements by the Children’s Act and 
further submits that same criteria could be used by South African courts considering in 
international surrogacy agreements before finding a contract null and void. The author 
further submits that the court should consider the reasons the commissioning parent(s) 
has for concluding an international surrogacy agreement and should require statements 
or oral evidence from the commissioning parent(s) setting out: evidence in relation to the 
strength of their relationship; ways in which the children’s interests and needs have 
priority and their involvement in the children’s day to day care.382 In Carlton & Bissett 
and Anor [2013] FamCa 143, the Judge held that ‘those who screened and assessed Mr 
Bissett in South Africa as suitable for this surrogacy agreement would be pleased to 
learn how well the children fare. The psychological assessment undertaken as part of 
that process is in evidence which provides ample evidence for confidence in Mr Bissett’s 
parental capacity.’383  
4.3.3 Best interests of the child 
The author has discussed the best interests of the child principle and has illustrated the 
importance of such principle in the paragraphs above. The involvement of a child is a 
strong justification for regulating this area. 
These recommendations will lessen the burden on courts and commissioning parents/ 
surrogate mothers, especially because we do not have case law or regulations 
governing international surrogacy agreements. Statutory regulations that contemplates 
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the possibility of international surrogacy agreements and parental and responsibility 
rights of commissioning parents could help courts if faced with such agreements.384 
In light of the above discussion, the argument for a system of regulation for international 
surrogacy agreements in South Africa gains relevance. As such, the combination of the 
inadequacy of current instruments to deal with international surrogacy, coupled with the 
difficulties which have been observed by examining reported South African case law, 
and the involvement of an innocent party (the child) without any choice at all in the 
matter necessitates the consideration of the possibility of international surrogacy and 
statutory regulations in the event that it occurs.  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter reflected the potential consequences of international surrogacy in South 
Africa. The author looked at the legal position of South Africans entering into an 
international surrogacy agreement and of foreigners entering into an international 
surrogacy agreement in South Africa. The author explored considerations that the court 
may consider when seized with an international surrogacy agreement case.  
In support of the submission that the South African courts should take a child rights 
based approach to international surrogacy agreements in South Africa, the author made 
brief reference to the international case law judgments on international surrogacy and 
proved that even if a country prohibits surrogacy or international surrogacy, there may 
still be a possibility of such an agreement occurring and, therefore, safeguards should 
be implemented to protect children born from surrogate agreements. 
Lastly, having regard to the all the submissions made in this chapter and the 
submissions made in chapter two, the author provide recommendations for the 
appropriate manner in which to legislate international surrogacy agreements in South 
Africa. The author suggests that administrative and judicial authorities could inspect the 
agreement and ensure that the terms do not harm the child and that the child is 
recognised as the legal child of the commissioning parents. Before ordering the 
international surrogacy agreement invalid and unenforceable, the courts should first look 
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at the suitability of the commissioning parents, how they intend to raise the child(ren) 
and finally consider the best interest of the child as paramount importance. 
 
It is suggested that statutory regulations that contemplate international surrogacy should 
be formulated, as a source of reference, which will assist a court when faced with 
determining the issue of parentage of a surrogate born child, and consequently, his or 
her nationality. The author suggests that the South African Parliament either re-drafts or 
provides clearer guidelines regarding surrogacy and the possibility of international 
surrogacy agreements. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS  
This research sought to investigate the extent to which South Africa recognises 
international surrogacy agreements. The objectives as provided for in Chapter 1 were to 
examine South Africa’s approach to confirming surrogacy agreements with an 
international dimension, whether entered into in South Africa and/or abroad.  
 
In Chapter two, the author examined the Chapter 19 of the Children’s Act for the 
purpose laying a foundation regarding surrogate motherhood agreements in South 
Africa. A brief discussion regarding the relevant terminology was presented, and 
thereafter the historical background of surrogacy in South Africa was examined. It was 
shown that, prior to the promulgation of the Children's Act, no legislation expressly 
provided for surrogacy agreements in South Africa. Although it was said that surrogacy 
was regulated indirectly by the Human Tissue Act, the Child Care Act and the Children’s 
Status Act, the aforementioned laws were not ideal because it excluded unmarried 
women from acting as surrogates. 
The absence of specific legislation governing surrogacy led to the Report of the Ad Hoc 
Committee on the Report of the South Africa Law Commission on Surrogate 
Motherhood in 1999. The underlying thread running throughout the Ad Hoc Committee’s 
recommendations were that surrogacy should not be banned but must be recognised 
and regulated through legislation. Furthermore, it was submitted that in all situations of 
surrogacy, the best interests of the child must be of principle consideration. 
Thereafter, the author provided an overview Chapter 19 of the Children’s Act. Section 
292(1)(b)-(e) of the Children’s Act sets out the requirements for a validity of a surrogate 
agreement. The validity of the agreement is governed by South African law if it was 
concluded in South Africa, and at least one of the commissioning parents and the 
surrogate mother and her husband or partner must be domiciled in South Africa at the 
time of entering into the agreement.  
 
The meaning and interpretation of domicile as a connecting factor is governed by the 
Domicile Act and discussed in Chapter 3. The requirement relating to surrogacy 
agreements concerning domicile may be disposed of on good cause shown. ‘Good 
cause shown’ as it relates to Chapter 19 of the Children’s Act has yet to be defined and 
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interpreted. The author submitted that ‘good cause shown’ is a gateway to confusion 
and uncertainty regarding international surrogacy in South Africa. For this reason, the 
author places emphasis on how important it is for South African legal authorities to 
discuss the possibility of how to protect the best interests of the child born from 
surrogacy agreements with an international dimension such as where one or both 
parties do not appear to be domiciled in South Africa. 
 
Subsequently, the author discussed reported judgments decided by South African 
courts. The Ex Parte Applications for the Confirmation of three Surrogate Motherhood 
Agreements 2011 6 SA 22 (GSJ) judgment provided practical guidance. This includes 
that surrogate motherhood agreements are generally not regarded as urgent matters. 
The court’s confirmation of the agreement is not a mere rubber stamp and will not be 
granted as a matter of course. The court, as upper guardian of all minor children, has a 
constitutional and international law duty to ensure that the interests of the children are 
paramount and the court takes this duty seriously. The success of an application will 
depend on the evidence provided to the court of the facts on which the application is 
based, to enable the court to make the statutorily required conclusions. Any and all 
expert reports must be in depth, reliable and provide a detailed factual exposition to 
support any recommendations made by the expert. These facts and evidence must 
relate to the general and specific appropriateness of the relevant parties, their financial 
resources, emotional stability and the irreversibility of the sterility of the commissioning 
parents.   
In Ex Parte WH 2011 6 SA 514 (GNP), a confirmation application was brought by a male 
same-sex couple allegedly domiciled in South Africa. The couple were of Dutch and 
Danish nationality respectively. In this case, court simply accepted the couple’s 
allegation that they were domiciled in South Africa. The author submitted that it is 
unfortunate that the court failed to provide guidelines on how to investigate whether the 
commissioning couple was indeed domiciled in South Africa. The problem with this is 
that the court ignored the statutory requirements for a valid surrogacy motherhood 
agreement in South Africa. The author submitted that the circumstances of this case 
lays a good foundation for her argument that South Africa should consider the possibility 
of a foreign national couple entering into a surrogacy motherhood agreement and 
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seeking confirmation by the court, or of foreign nationals using South Africa’s surrogacy 
services, as well as South Africans going abroad to seek surrogacy services. 
In Ex Parte MS and Others 2014 (3) SA 415 (GP), the court was seized with a 
retrospective application for confirmation of a surrogate motherhood agreement 
concluded after fertilisation had already taken place. The issue before the court was 
whether it was possible for the court to confirm a surrogate motherhood agreement after 
fertilisation. Keightley AJ held that the Children’s Act did not provide a definitive answer 
to this question. Although the Act expressly prohibits artificial fertilisation of the 
surrogate mother prior to the surrogacy agreement being confirmed by the court, the Act 
was silent as to how the validity of such an agreement is affected by non-compliance. 
Thus, in the opinion of the court, it had the discretion to confirm a surrogate motherhood 
agreement in circumstances where the fertilisation occurred before the confirmation. It 
was also held that it would be contrary to section 28(2) of the Constitution (the best 
interests of the child) if the court did not have the discretion to retrospectively confirm 
such surrogate motherhood agreement. Therefore the court had to retain the discretion 
to do so if the court was satisfied that it would be in the best interest of the child to be 
born. 
 
The author submitted that this case is another example of how South African courts tend 
to ignore the basic statutory requirements. The author submitted further that the case 
proves once again that guidelines are needed for the interpretation of the Children’s Act. 
In the case of AB v Minister of Social Development, the applicants challenged the 
constitutional validity of the provisions of section 294 of the Children’s Act on the 
grounds that the genetic link requirement violates various fundamental rights. The 
genetic link requirement made it impossible for the first applicant to conclude a 
surrogate agreement and consequently made it impossible for her to become a parent. It 
was argued by the applicants that the concept of surrogacy means to create an 
opportunity to persons who cannot give birth themselves to become parents irrespective 
of whether the child will be genetically related to the parent or not. The case was set 
down for confirmation of the declaration of constitutional invalidity in February 2016, but 
judgment from the Constitutional Court is still awaited. 
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This case was also discussed in Chapter four where the author discussed various 
scenarios of international surrogacy agreements. In this specific scenario, the author 
submitted non-recognition of a parent-child relationship leads to various disadvantages 
for children. They might not be registered in a country because they legally do not have 
parents (in the event that the surrogate mother does not want the child). The genetic 
bond between a parent and child is given special legal treatment not simply because of 
the genetic link, but because of the unique responsibilities associated with the bond. 
In Chapter three, the author explored the South African legislation that may be 
applicable to the children born of commissioning parents (whether the commissioning 
parents are South Africans or foreign nationals) who entered into international surrogacy 
agreements. The author enumerated the requirements of birth registration in South 
Africa to show the birth registration process in South Africa and to determine whether 
the legislation might be applicable to international surrogacy agreements.  
The author concluded that the South African Citizenship Act 88 of 1995 has provided 
children born to South African or foreign nationals living in South Africa some sort of 
protection against statelessness. Section 2(2) of the Citizenship Act provides that any 
person born on the territory who is statelessness is entitles to South African citizenship 
by birth, provided the birth is registered in accordance with South African law. As the law 
stands, a child born from an international surrogacy agreement will be the child of the 
surrogate mother because the agreement would not be confirmed by the High Court and 
thus the agreement would not be enforceable. The author expostulates against the 
current position of South African law because of the possibility of the surrogate mother 
not wanting the child. In a situation where the surrogate mother cannot afford to take 
care of the child, the commissioning parents (whether South Africans or foreign 
nationals) are willing to provide the child with the parental care that the child needs. In 
both instances denying the recognition of legal parentage of the commissioning parents 
in respect of the child, unjustifiably violates his or her constitutional rights.  
Problems often arise when the commissioning parent(s) attempt to return to their home 
country with the child. Problems may also arise when the commissioning parent(s) wish 
to register the child’s foreign birth certificate in their home country or when they attempt 
to register a judicial or administrative order relating to the child’s parentage in their 
country.  
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The author submitted that section 13 of the Births and Deaths Registration Act and 
section 2(1)(b) of the South African Citizenship Act might be favourable in cases of 
international surrogacy. However, it depends on whether the country in which the 
surrogate-born child recognises the surrogate mother or the commissioning mother as 
the child’s legal mother/parent. These sections provide for notification to the head of 
South African consular mission of a child born of a South African father or mother 
outside the Republic of South Africa and persons born outside the Republic of South 
Africa to a South African parent are citizens by birth, respectively. 
Thereafter, the author looked at the criminal aspect of international surrogacy 
agreements. Section 305 of the Children’s Act provides that a person who contravenes 
the provisions of s 301, 302 and 303,is guilty of an offence and liable to a fine or 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding 10 years, or both a fine and imprisonment. The 
author submitted that the court needs to consider if seized with an international 
surrogacy agreement, whether it would be null and void and whether the parties to the 
agreement are liable to a fine or imprisonment. 
Using the foundation established in Chapter two and three, Chapter four of this research 
demonstrated legal difficulties and potential rights infringed on or denied to the child 
born of an international surrogacy by examining international case law. The author 
submitted that examination of international case law will contribute to providing reasons 
why South African courts should implement safeguards in the context of international 
surrogacy agreements. The author submitted that South African courts do not have 
precedents, guidelines or legislation governing international surrogacy. The author 
further submitted that one of the main consequences of international surrogacy relates 
to the possibility of a surrogate born child suffering from not being legally recognized as 
the legal child of his or her commissioning parents. As a result, the child can be left with 
no parents and no nationality.  
It was submitted that in light of the scenario and case analysis, a strong trend emerges - 
that of a contradiction between the written law and actual practices in the area. It has 
been shown that no matter the domestic regime in place regarding surrogacy, whether 
permitted or not, states appear to be continually faced with these types of arrangements. 
The author submitted that given the continuing growth of international surrogacy and the 
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wide range of human rights challenges it presents, it is important for South African 
authorities and courts to consider the possibility of international surrogacy occurring in 
South Africa. The author hopes that the South African courts take a child-centered 
approach, building on the views established in the international case law that was 
discussed in Chapter four, and that courts do not adopt a strict interpretation of our 
current laws. 
Lastly, having regard to the all the submissions made in this thesis, the author provided 
recommendations for the appropriate manner in which to legislate international 
surrogacy agreements in South Africa. The author provided that judicial and 
administrative authorities could inspect the agreement and ensure that the terms do not 
harm the child and that the child is recognised as the legal child of the commissioning 
parents. Before ordering the international surrogacy agreement null and void; the courts 
should first look at the suitability of the commissioning parents and finally consider the 
best interest of the child as paramount importance. 
 
It is suggested that statutory regulations that contemplates international surrogacy 
should be formulated, as a source of reference, which will assist a court when faced with 
determining the issue of parentage of a surrogate born child, and consequently, his or 
her nationality. The author further suggested that the South African Parliament either re-
drafts or provides clearer guidelines regarding surrogacy and the possibility of 
international surrogacy agreements. 
The aim of this research was to determine the extent in which South Africa recognises 
international surrogacy. However, to what extent is ultimately uncertain. It is time for the 
South African law to recognize the possibility of international surrogacy and to confront 
the prevailing issues stemming from international surrogacy agreements. 
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